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47 
Transnational Fiduciary Law:            
Spaces and Elements 
Thilo Kuntz* 
In recent years, fiduciary law has increasingly moved to the center of scholarly attention in the 
common law world. Even a cursory review shows ample evidence of the importance of fiduciary-
related norms; not only both in common law and civil law jurisdictions, but also beyond the nation 
state. Although civil law countries have no tradition of the trust as a legal institution, courts and 
scholars alike term relationships based on some kind of personal or professional trust “fiduciary”. 
Additionally, the trust as a legal institution is gaining ground in civil law countries, either following 
a national recognition of the Hague Trust Convention (e.g., Italy, the Netherlands) or because they 
have introduced trust legislation (Japan and other countries in East Asia). A number of more 
sector-specific rules and regulations issued by institutions and initiatives such as the OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance and the UN report on “Fiduciary Duty for the 21st Century” 
are shaping legal norms and legislation. 
In other areas of the law with regulations and rules spreading beyond the nation state, scholars 
have been trying to spell out a concept of “transnational law”, determined to embrace the notion of 
“something being there” which doesn’t quite fit the bill of the traditional dichotomy of national law 
or international law. Given the phenomena described above, the question driving this Article is 
subsequently: Is there such a thing as transnational fiduciary law? Answering this question and 
mapping a research agenda proves to be a thorny issue, however. Not only is fiduciary law itself 
“elusive”. The same is true for transnational law and transnational legal theory. Methodologically, 
this makes thinking about transnational fiduciary law a daunting task. 
Grappling with all these issues, this Article aims to make a twofold contribution: First and 
foremost, it tries to lay a ground stone for transnational fiduciary law as a field, existing at the 
intersection of transnational law and fiduciary law. Second, it expands both transnational law and 
fiduciary law by establishing new perspectives on both fields. It explores how transnational law may 
evolve out of national norms. Additionally, the Article shows the possibility of crossing the common 
law-civil law divide in fiduciary law and demonstrates that, compared to the traditional common-
law view, the fiduciary duty of loyalty may develop different kinds of distinctiveness in transnational 
settings. It builds on two main examples: horizontal transnational ordering of the trust in East 
Asia and vertical ordering of fiduciary law with respect to standards and principles concerning 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues. 
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for Corporate and Capital Markets Law, Bucerius Law School, Hamburg, Germany. E-Mail: 
Thilo.Kuntz@law-school.de. 
48 UCI JRNL. OF INT’L, TRANSNATIONAL, & COMP. L. [Vol.  5:47 
I.Introduction....................................................................................................................48 
II. Theorizing Transnational Fiduciary Law and the Civil Law/Common Law 
Divide..................................................................................................................................54 
A. The Challenge of Theorizing Transnational Fiduciary Law ........................55 
B. Transnational Law and Comparative Law ......................................................57 
C. Fiduciary Law in Civil Law Jurisdictions: Germany as a Case Study .........59 
III. Spaces of Transnational Fiduciary Law.................................................................. 63 
A. Horizontal Transnational Ordering of Fiduciary Law .................................64 
 1. National Law’s Uncertain Status in Transnational Legal Theory ............64 
 2. Transnationalization Through Entanglement of National Laws............. 66 
      a. Introductory Example: The Diffusion of Trust Law in East Asia .....67 
        b. Entanglement, Histoire Croisée and Transnational Legal Spaces ......68 
B. Vertical Transnational Ordering of Fiduciary Law .......................................70 
 1. Standards and Principles................................................................................ 71 
 2. Normative Effects of Non-binding Rules.................................................. 72 
      a. The French “Loi PACTE” ....................................................................... 73 
       b. EU ESG-reporting Standards ...................................................................74 
       c. Acknowledgment Through the Enforcement of Rights, Remedies and  
      Exercise of Power ............................................................................................75 
C. Transnational, Not Global Fiduciary Law .....................................................77 
IV. Elements of Transnational Fiduciary Law............................................................. 78 
A. The Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty and the Scope of Contract in Common Law  
     and Civil Law...................................................................................................... 78 
B. Contents of Fiduciary Obligations................................................................... 79 
C. Constructing the Duty of Loyalty ....................................................................80 
V. Summary .......................................................................................................................82 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, fiduciary law has increasingly moved to the center of scholarly 
attention in the common law world.1 In spite of its “elusive” nature,2 enough 
instances of fiduciary relationships occur across a wide variety of legal areas that 
many–with good cause–describe it as a distinctive field.3 Although civil law 
 
1.  The increasing number of volumes on fiduciary law bears testimony to this: see 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014); 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW (D. Gordon Smith & Andrew S. Gold eds., 2018); THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW (Evan J. Criddle, Paul B. Miller, Robert H. Sitkoff eds., 
2019). 
2.   Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 79 DUKE L.J. 879, 
879 (1988). 
3.   Groundbreaking: Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795 (1983); see also 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 1 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014) 
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countries have no tradition of the trust as a legal institution,4 courts and scholars 
alike term relationships based on some kind of personal or professional trust 
“fiduciary.”5 German law subjects guardians,6 trustees in bankruptcy,7 attorneys,8 
and others to a specific set of duties, the most important of which is a duty of 
loyalty.9 France has introduced “la fiducie.”10 Additionally, the trust as a legal 
institution is gaining ground in civil law countries, following a national recognition 
of the Hague Trust Convention (e.g., Italy, the Netherlands).11 Courts across 
 
(“Whether it is viewed from the perspective of relationships, rights and duties, or wrongs and remedies, 
fiduciary law is a distinctive body of law.”). 
4.   See, e.g., Richard Helmholz & Reinhard Zimmermann, Views of Trust and Treuhand: An 
Introduction, in ITINERA FIDUCIAE: TRUST AND TREUHAND IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 27 (Richard 
Helmholz & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 1998). 
5.   See Thilo Kuntz, Das Recht der Interessenwahrungsverhältnisse und Perspektiven von Fiduciary Law 
in Deutschland, in I FESTSCHRIFT FÜR KARSTEN SCHMIDT ZUM 80. GEBURTSTAG 761 (Katharina Boele-
Woelki et al. eds., 2019) (in German). 
6.   E.g., Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], Mar. 30, 1955, 17 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFS IN ZIVILSACHEN [BGHZ] 108 (116); KONRAD 
RUSCH, GEWINNHAFTUNG BEI VERLETZUNG VON TREUEPFLICHTEN, 191 (2003); Walter 
Zimmermann, in SOERGEL, 20 KOMMENTAR ZUM BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH § 1833 margin no. 
1, 3 (13th ed. 2000). 
7.   214 BGHZ 220 (margin no. 12) (Ger.); Udo Becker, Insolvenzverwalterhaftung bei Untern 
ehmensfortführung 40 (2017).  
8.    E.g., Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Court of Appeal] Brandenburg, Mar. 5, 2012, Neue 
Juristische Wochenschrift – Rechtsprechungsreport [NJW-RR] 1191 (1193). The legal basis for 
fiduciary duties of a German attorney (Rechtsanwalt) is to be found in Section 43a of the Federal Lawyer’s 
Act (Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung): “The basic duties of a Rechtsanwalt: (1) A Rechtsanwalt may not enter 
into any ties that pose a threat to his/her professional independence. (2)  A Rechtsanwalt has a duty to 
observe professional secrecy. This duty relates to everything that has become known to the 
Rechtsanwalt in professional practice. This does not apply to facts that are obvious or which do not 
need to be kept secret from the point of view of their significance. (3) A Rechtsanwalt must not behave 
with lack of objectivity in professional practice. Conduct which lacks objectivity is particularly 
understood as conduct which involves the conscious dissemination of untruths or making denigrating 
statements when other parties involved or the course of the proceedings have given no cause for such 
statements. (4)  A Rechtsanwalt may not represent conflicting interests. (5)  A Rechtsanwalt must 
exercise the requisite care in handling any assets entrusted to him/her. Monies belonging to third parties 
must be immediately forwarded to the entitled recipient or paid into a fiduciary account. (6)  A 
Rechtsanwalt has a duty to engage in continuing professional development.” Translatated in 
http://www.brak.de/w/files/02_fuer_anwaelte/ brao_engl_ 090615.pdf (last accessed Oct. 15, 2019). 
9.   See Kuntz, supra note 5, at 762 et seq. 
10.   Loi 2007-211 du 19 février 2007 instituant la fiducie [Law 2007-211 of Feb. 19, 2007 on 
Instituting the Trust], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE 
OF FRANCE] Feb. 21, 2007, p. 3052. On open questions concerning concept and doctrine, e.g., Yaëll 
Emerich, Les Fondements Conceptuels de la Fiducie Française Face au Trust de la Common Law: Entre Droit des 
Contrats et Droit des Biens, 61 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARE 49 (2009) (comparing the 
French fiducie with the common law trust); see also the short overview in Martin Gelter & Geneviève 
Helleringer, Fiduciary Principles in European Civil Law Systems, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
FIDUCIARY LAW 583, 594 (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019). 
11.   Hague Conf. on Priv. Int’l L. [HCCH], Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on Their 
Recognition (July 1, 1985), https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=59; for a 
list of signatories and the status of ratification: https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/ 
status-table/?cid=59 (both internet sources last accessed Oct. 15, 2019). See also COMMERCIAL TRUSTS 
IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: THE INTEREST AND SCOPE OF THE ENQUIRY (Michele Graziadei, Ugo 
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common law jurisdictions and common law legal scholarship deal concepts and 
ideas concerning fiduciary law back and forth.12 Moreover, civil law countries 
combined property and contract law in order to fashion substitutes for the common 
law trust. Contract-based Treuhandverhältnisse, i.e. relationships of trust, have been 
part and staple of the German legal discourse for several decades, if not centuries.13 
Some scholars even argue for progressing towards a hybrid system of fiduciary 
law, built on unified principles applicable both in common law and civil law 
jurisdictions.14 East Asian countries with a strong civil law background such as 
Japan created the trust as a legal institution.15 Mixed legal systems in the United 
States (Louisiana) and Canada (Quebec) did the same.16 On top of that, a number 
of more sector-specific rules and regulations issued by institutions and initiatives 
such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Finance Initiative17 
(e.g., the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance18 and the UN report on 
“Fiduciary Duty for the 21st Century”19) are shaping legal norms and legislation, 
without having the force of law themselves–at least viewed from traditional Hartian 
or Kelsenian accounts of law. 
In short, even a cursory review shows ample evidence of the importance of 
fiduciary-related norms; not only both in common law and civil law jurisdictions, 
but also beyond the nation state. Additionally, many norms are not only created 
through national or quasi-national legislation on a supranational level as, e.g., in the 
European Union, but also by non-governmental actors. 
In other areas of the law with regulations and rules spreading beyond the 
nation state, scholars have been trying to spell out a concept of transnational law, 
determined to embrace the notion of “something being there” which doesn’t quite 
 
Mattei, Lionel Smith eds., 2005); RE-IMAGINING THE TRUST: TRUSTS IN CIVIL LAW (Lionel Smith ed., 
2012). 
12.   See infra IV.2, for more on this. 
13.   See Stefan Grundmann, The Evolution of Trust and Treuhand in the 20th Century, in Helmholz 
& Zimmermann, supra note 4, at 469.  
14.   Tamar Frankel, Toward Universal Fiduciary Principles, 39 QUEEN’S L.J. 391 (2014). 
15.   See infra III.1.b.i, for more on this. 
16.   On Louisiana, see Michael McAuley, Truth and reconciliation: Notions of property in Louisiana’s 
Civil and Trust Codes, in RE-IMAGINING THE TRUST: TRUSTS IN CIVIL LAW 119 (Lionel Smith ed., 2012). 
On Quebec, see JOHN B. CLAXTON, STUDIES ON THE QUEBEC LAW OF TRUST (2005).  
17.   Background, UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME FINANCE INITIATIVE, 
https://www.unep fi.org/about/background/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2019).  
18.   ORG. FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT [OECD], G20/OECD 
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2015), https://www.oecd.org/corporate/principles-
corporate-govern ance.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2019).  
19.   Fiduciary Duty in the 21st Century, https://www.fiduciaryduty21.org/ (last visited Oct. 21, 
2019).  
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fit the bill of the traditional dichotomy of national law or international law.20 In the 
well-known words of Philip Jessup:21 
[T]he term “international” is misleading since it suggests that one is concerned 
only with the relations of one nation (or state) to other nations (or states). . . . Part 
of the difficulty in analyzing the problem of the world community and the law 
regulating them is the lack of an appropriate word or term for the rules we are 
discussing. Just as the word “international” is inadequate to describe the problem, 
so the term “international law” will not do. . . . I shall use, instead of “international 
law,” the term “transnational law” to include all law which regulates actions or 
events that transcend national frontiers. Both public and private international law 
are included, as are other rules which do not wholly fit into such standard categories. 
Given the phenomena described above, the rather obvious question driving 
this Article is subsequently: is there such a thing as transnational fiduciary law? 
Answering this question and mapping a research agenda proves to be a thorny issue 
however. Not only is fiduciary law itself “elusive.”22 The same is true for 
transnational law and transnational legal theory. More than one scholar attempting 
to capture the concept of transnational law ends up with playing a fugue in minor: 
“Transnational law remains an imprecise notion.”23 Anyone slogging through the 
heap of literature on transnational legal theory ends up in “a jungle without a 
map.”24 
Moreover, some lawyers, especially those with a common law background, 
may question if the project is not seriously limited from the start. If the trust is a 
creature born and bred in the common law, how can a transnational fiduciary law 
framework encompass both civil law and common law countries? This is a question 
traditionally allocated to the comparativist’s breadbasket. But again, the scholar 
seeking to stand on the shoulders of others is in danger of misstepping. It seems 
that comparative law and transnational law seem to have a lot in common. Not even 
the latest edition of the Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law,25 arguably one of 
the most sophisticated and far-reaching volumes on the subject, contains a distinct 
section on either comparative law or transnational law, let alone one on comparative 
fiduciary law.26 Methodologically, this makes thinking about transnational fiduciary 
law a daunting task. It cuts across transnational law, fiduciary law, and comparative 
law with only one certainty: even fundamental issues are unclear, elusive, and hotly 
 
20.   See, e.g., GRALF-PETER CALLIESS & PEER ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH CONSENSUS AND 
RUNNING CODE: A THEORY OF TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW (2010); Roger Cotterrell, What is 
Transnational Law?, 37 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 500, 500 (2012); Gregory Shaffer, Theorizing Transnational Legal 
Ordering, 12 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 231, 232 (2016).  
21.  PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1956).  
22.   See DeMott, supra note 2.  
23.   Cotterrell, supra note 20, at 522.  
24.   Shaffer, supra note 20, at 232.  
25.   THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard 
Zimmermann eds., 2d ed. 2019).  
26.   On this blind spot of comparative law, see Mathias Reimann, Beyond National Systems: A 
Comparative Law for the International Age, 75 TUL. L. REV. 1103, 1108 et seq. (2001).  
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debated. At least at first glance, the endeavor of finding a vantage point puts the 
author in a legal cockleshell without oars in the middle of the Atlantic, drifting along 
on an ocean of literature. 
Grappling with all these issues, this Article aims to make a twofold 
contribution: first and foremost, it lay a ground stone for transnational fiduciary law 
as a field, existing at the intersection of transnational law and fiduciary law. Second, 
it expands both transnational law and fiduciary law by establishing new perspectives 
on both fields. It explores how transnational law may evolve out of national norms. 
Additionally, the Article shows the possibility of crossing the common law- civil law 
divide in fiduciary law and demonstrates that, compared to the traditional common 
law view, the fiduciary duty of loyalty may develop different kinds of distinctiveness 
in transnational settings. The Article proceeds along the following lines of argument: 
Section two deals with a significant preliminary. According to many a common 
lawyer’s intuition, the divide between common law and civil law with respect to 
equity and the trust as a legal institution gives cause to question the project as a 
whole. From a functional perspective, however, the different legal traditions do not 
present a significant obstacle. Both civil law and common law countries have to deal 
with the phenomenon of one person enjoying some sort of discretionary power 
over the interests or position of another. Comparatively speaking, this establishes a 
common tertium comparationis and therefore a point of entry for transnational 
fiduciary law. 
Given that “[t]here is no unicity of its sources and no systemic form of 
justification” and that “it does not conform to a general or universal model,”27 it is 
no wonder that definitions of transnational law have multiplied over the years.28 
Anyone talking about transnational law needs to take a stand and clearly set out 
their premises, otherwise they run into the danger of becoming incoherent. 
Accordingly, the third section (III.) takes a deeper look into the methodological 
toolbox and scrutinizes the horizontal and vertical ordering of fiduciary law. On the 
horizontal level, transnational fiduciary law may come into existence as a 
consequence of entangled national legal orders. The starting point is a blind spot 
left by conventional transnational legal theory. Concentrating on “norms beyond 
the nation state,” most scholars neglect that national laws themselves might be a 
suitable basis for the emergence of a transnational legal order. Drawing on the 
theory of histoire croisée and connected histories, this Article argues that transnational 
law may come into existence through the entanglement of national laws. Spreading 
out from Japan, the trust has been diffused over South Korea, Taiwan and China–
all countries with a strong civil law background. Close historical ties and traditions 
shared among the “East Asian four” have established connections between the legal 
systems and a strong sense of awareness as to how the respective others develop 
 
27.   H. Patrick Glenn, A Transnational Concept of Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL 
STUDIES 839, 860 (Mark Tushnet & Peter Cane eds., 2005).  
28.   Excellent overviews are provided by Cotterell, supra note 20; Shaffer, supra note 20; LARS 
VIELLECHNER, TRANSNATIONALISIERUNG DES RECHTS 159 (2013) (in German). See also Glenn, supra 
note 27, at 849.  
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their national laws—allowing legal reforms in one country to echo changes in the 
laws of the other East Asian Four. Going far beyond standard comparative fare, 
these co-evolutions make it impossible to understand national norms without taking 
into account this background of entangled laws. 
Vertical ordering of fiduciary law occurs whenever norms “beyond the state” 
become implemented in multiple national systems. A good example are the 
standards and principles concerning environmental, social, and governance (ESG) 
issues. These standards and principles, generated by the United Nations, the OECD 
and other non-state actors, contain a rich body of norms on fiduciary law, aiming 
at integrating stakeholder interests into the fiduciary duties of corporate boards and 
investment managers. They address policy makers and legislators all over the world 
and purport to provide benchmarks for the creation of legal norms on the national 
level.29 Given their intended scope of application and transformation into laws 
within multiple nation states, such frameworks potentially provide the basis for 
transnational legal orders and, in the present context, for transnational fiduciary law. 
The question remains, however, as to whether and how these norms turn from non-
binding standards and principles into law, at least from a socio-legal perspective. 
Pundits close to the Delaware approach in corporate law and traditional US 
investment managers’ fiduciary law are quick to deny the legal relevance of ESG 
standards. Both the loi PACTE, a recent piece of French legislation, and EU ESG-
reporting standards prove them wrong, however. Nation-states with stakeholder-
oriented governance systems provide doors which allow so-called “soft law” to 
enter and settle down as hard fiduciary law. 
However, merely looking at the spaces of legal ordering is not enough, 
however. Transnational legal orders “articulate … a set of norms for legal subjects 
over a given territory.”30 Consequently, a transnational legal order is not only 
defined by its regional extension or geographic scope, but also by its normative 
elements or what may be called its intension. In other words, talking about “orders” 
implies being able to define a legal scope.31 This can only be done by identifying the 
relevant norms at play in a specific area of legal ordering spanning a certain 
geographic space. Therefore, the fourth section engages with different elements in 
the transnational ordering of fiduciary law. Viewing fiduciary law(s) through the lens 
of transnational legal theory helps to shed some light on its confines, even within 
the common law world. It is defined by specific elements, specific traditions and 
the extent to which it binds social relationships. Whereas the duty of loyalty serves 
as the distinctive marker of fiduciary relationships in the common law, set apart 
from contract and contract-law principles, it cannot do comparable work in civil 
 
29.   See, e.g., OECD, supra note 18, at 9 (“On the basis of the Principles, it is the role of 
government, semi-government or private sector initiatives to assess the quality of the corporate 
governance framework and develop more detailed mandatory or voluntary provisions that can take into 
account country-specific economic, legal, and cultural differences.”).  
30.   Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Orders, in TRANSNATIONAL 
LEGAL ORDERS 3, 28 (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds., 2015). 
31.   Id. 
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law countries. Many of contract law’s shortcomings in the common law do not exist 
in a civil law regime. Therefore, the duty of loyalty is not distinctive in the way it is 
in England, the United States of America and other regions on the globe resting on 
equity traditions. It is distinctive, however, in that it separates fiduciary relationships 
from other agreements by implementing an obligation unknown to “regular” 
contracts. Again, the trust in East Asia illustrates how this plays out in legal reality. 
As the example of communication between Australian and English courts shows, 
different transnational orders of fiduciary law evolve even in the common law 
world. Whereas, e.g., the United States recognizes the duty of care as a fiduciary 
obligation, English and Australian courts explicitly deny this possibility. Courts 
communicating across the borders of nation states have built an entangled regime 
of national fiduciary law, producing a transnational version of fiduciary law to a 
certain extent set apart from other nations of the common law. Finally, the last 
section summarizes the main findings. 
II.  THEORIZING TRANSNATIONAL FIDUCIARY LAW AND THE CIVIL 
LAW/COMMON LAW DIVIDE 
Anyone theorizing about transnational fiduciary law has to grapple with a 
challenge absent from the conventional legal material that transnational legal theory 
deals with. A strong line in transnational legal theory relates to contract practice 
beyond the nation state. For Western nation states, freedom of contract is a core 
principle of their respective private laws; thus talking about contract law and 
contractual models does not encounter significant obstacles with respect to 
methodology. Fiduciary law with its strong roots in equity traditions not known in 
civil law jurisdictions is different. As shown in Sub-section 1., comparative law and 
the functional method it relies on32 provides tools for overcoming differences in 
doctrine and legal traditions. What remains to be elucidated, however, is the 
relationship between transnational law and comparative law. It will be argued below 
in Sub-section 2. that transnational law necessarily involves comparability. After 
these methodological preliminaries, Sub-section 3. puts the tools to use. Given that 
the comparative literature is sparse and views civil law regimes through a bird’s 
eye,33 and, alas, is not always very precise, it seems useful to discuss a specific 
example in greater detail in order to show the mechanisms at work. Regarding 
Germany’s position as one of the major and most traditional civil law orders, it 
seems especially suitable as the basis for a case study. 
 
32.   At least according to the still-prevailing view in the literature on comparative law. This 
Article is not the place for a discussion, but rather must build on what the majority of scholars in 
comparative law still uses as the methodological standard. For a (critical) review, see Ralf Michaels, The 
Functional Method of Comparative Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 345 
(Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2d ed. 2019).  
33.   See Gelter & Helleringer, supra note 10; Michele Graziadei, Virtue and Utility: Fiduciary Law 
in Civil Law and Common Law Jurisdictions, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 287 
(Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014). 
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A. The Challenge of Theorizing Transnational Fiduciary Law 
Many of those thinking about transnational legal theory take their cue from 
commerce practice and the web of social norms fostered and stabilized by 
standardized contractual arrangements. The staple examples looming large in the 
literature emanate from what many coin “law merchant” or lex mercatoria.34 
Examples abound, such as, the Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary 
Credits and the INCOTERMS both issued by the International Chamber of 
Commerce in Paris,35 the International Swaps and Derivatives Association’s master 
agreements for derivatives,36 Internet Regulation by ICANN,37 or standards set by 
the International Organization for Standardization (ISO).38 An important factor 
driving the success story of transnational private legal ordering is freedom of 
contract. At least in Western capitalist democracies, market participants enjoy 
considerable leeway to shape their relations with others and act under obligations 
they choose to undertake. Discrepancies in detail notwithstanding, most common 
law and civil law countries share a baseline.39 As a consequence, there is no need to 
build a bridge between the legal systems in order to have a scratch line to start a 
research project from. 
Fiduciary law is different. Common law lawyers may question the endeavor of 
transnational fiduciary law from the start because of their own fiduciary law’s 
specific background and history.40 It evolved on a general level out of equity and 
equitable remedies and is tightly bound to the trust as a legal institution.41 Civil law 
 
34.   May it be real or imagined, see Gralf-Peter Calliess, Transnationales Verbrauchervertragsrecht, in 
68 RABELSZ 244, 254 (2004); CALLIESS & ZUMBANSEN, supra note 20, at 28; Gunther Teubner, ‘Global 
Bukowina’: Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3, 8 et seq. (Teubner 
ed., 1997), on the one hand; and Halliday & Shaffer, supra note 30, at 15 (with note 8), on the other.  
35.   See, e.g., Gregory Shaffer, How Business Shapes Law: A Socio-Legal Framework, 42 CONN. L. 
REV. 147 (2009).  
36.   INTERNATIONAL SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASSOCIATION, INC., www2.isda.org (last 
visited Oct. 24, 2019). See, e.g., Johan Horst, Lex Financiaria. Das transnationale Finanzmarktrecht der 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), 53 ARCHIV DES VÖLKERRECHTS 461 (2015) (in 
German).  
37.   See Lars Viellechner, Governing Through Transnational Arrangements: The Case of Internet Domain 
Allocation, in SOCIETY, REGULATION AND GOVERNANCE: NEW MODES OF SHAPING SOCIAL 
CHANGE? 106 (Regine Paul et al. eds., 2017).  
38.   See, e.g., TIM BÜTHE & WALTER MATTLI, THE NEW GLOBAL RULERS: THE 
PRIVATIZATION OF REGULATION IN THE WORD ECONOMY 162 (2011).  
39.   “Most,” considering that some members of each family may deviate. China, to give one 
example, is a civil law country. Freedom of contract in a Western sense, however, seems not to be the 
all-foundational principle of its legal order, judged from the outside. 
40.   But see Frankel, supra note 14.  
41.   On the importance of both equity and the trust for common fiduciary law: Joshua Getzler, 
Fiduciary Principles in English Common Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 471 (Evan 
J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019). That is not to say that today trust is the only foundation of fiduciary law. 
The second pillar, especially in the U.S., is agency law. On agency law as a source of fiduciary law: 
Deborah DeMott, The Fiduciary Character of Agency and the Interpretation of Instructions, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW 321(D. Gordon Smith & Andrew S. Gold eds., 2018); Deborah 
DeMott, Fiduciary Principles in Agency Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra, at 
23.  
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systems traditionally lack both. They have never had an equity tradition and 
therefore know no equitable remedies.42 Moreover, the trust in its common law 
form as dual ownership either is unknown (e.g., Germany, Switzerland),43 even 
though a number of civil law countries recognize the trust as a matter of private 
international law (e.g., Italy, Netherlands) or have even implemented the trust (e.g., 
Japan).44 How can there be “real” transnational fiduciary law if the latter group lacks 
equity and traditionally does not know the trust as a core institution? Furthermore, 
fiduciary duties, especially the duty of loyalty, have a strong anchor in national law 
and may, at least according to conventional wisdom, not be contracted out of by 
the parties.45 Establishing some kind of framework constituting fiduciary standards 
beyond the nation state thus apparently is much more challenging in jurisdictions 
putting fiduciary relationships in the vicinity of contract law. Evidence lies right at 
hand, or so it seems, with major players like Germany not having ratified it; the 
Hague Trust Convention has not met much approval in the civil law world.46 
On the other hand, however, no one can deny the successful diffusion of the 
trust in East Asia. Starting out in Japan, the trust as a legal institution spread via 
South Korea and Taiwan to China.47 Regardless of their legal family background, 
the respective trust laws include a duty of loyalty or at least duties requiring a 
trustee’s loyal behavior.48 There are attorneys, corporate directors, trustees in 
bankruptcy, guardians, and a plethora of other persons working in positions and 
exercising functions similar to their counterparts in Australia, England, or the 
United States of America–which are all deemed fiduciaries in the common law.49 
German courts and scholars, to give one example from perhaps one of the most 
“civilistic” of the civil law countries, employ the rhetoric of fiduciary law, even 
though, for lack of an established model such as the trust in common law 
jurisdictions, it is impossible to go forward by analogy to an archetype serving as a 
guide post.50 In many instances, there is something called “fiduciary duty” and 
 
42.   Gelter & Helleringer, supra note 10, at 585. 
43.   See Bundescgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] Jan. 29, 1970, 96 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN 
DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN BUNDESGERICHTS [BGE] II 79, 88 (Switz.), for Switzerland. 
44.   On the trust in East Asia infra III.1.b.i. 
45.   DeMott, supra note 2, at 885–86; Scott FitzGibbon, Fiduciary Relationships Are Not Contracts, 
82 MARQ. L. REV. 303 (1999); TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW, 229–35 (2011). For an opposing 
view, for example, Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J. L. & 
ECON. 425 (1993); with certain reservations John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 
105 YALE L.J. 625, 671 (1995); see also D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 
VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1492 (2002). 
46.   See Hague Conf. on Priv. Int’l L. [HCCH], Status Table 30: Convention of 1 July 1985 on the Law 
Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition, https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-
table/?cid=59 (Oct. 19, 2017). 
47.   Masayuki Tamaruya, Japanese Law and the Global Diffusion of Trust and Fiduciary Law, 103 IOWA 
L. REV. 2229 (2018). 
48.   See infra IV.3. 
49.   See, e.g., Smith, supra note 45, at 1450–83 (listing types of relationships courts have 
concluded are fiduciary in nature). 
50.   See RUSCH, supra note 6, at 193 et seq. 
2020]      TRANSNATIONAL FIDUCIARY LAW: SPACES AND ELEMENTS 57 
“fiduciary law” in the United States mirrored by Treuepflicht in Germany.51 The fact 
remains, however, that many of the relationships deemed “fiduciary” in Germany 
and other civil law countries are governed by contract or quasi-contractual 
mechanisms. At first glance, this contrasts starkly with the majority opinion in 
common law fiduciary law scholarship according to which fiduciary law is not 
contract.52 Before pondering whether comparative law’s functional approach may 
help to resolve this predicament (infra 3.), an intermediate step has to be taken. 
Resorting to comparative law in the context of transnational law requires exploring 
the relationship between these two. 
B. Transnational Law and Comparative Law 
The relationship between transnational law or transnational legal theory and 
comparative law and its methodology has mostly evaded scholarly attention so far. 
Although to the mind of this author many scholars of transnational law heavily 
invest in exercises in comparative law, the methodological premises are rarely made 
explicit. Two books on transnational legal theory which have been (justifiably) 
widely perceived as important contributions to the field53 do not put their finger on 
the issue. Pertinent journal articles accepting conventional premises about 
transnational law are at least not so easy to find.54 The rare article here and there 
pointing to comparative law as a necessary tool for transnational law55 sketches an 
idiosyncratic definition of the latter that stands square to conventional theory. 
Others tackle the rapport between transnational law and comparative law from the 
direction of the latter and either declare comparative law to be transnational law56 
or want to enrich comparative law by integrating insights from transnational legal 
theory.57 
 
51.   See the examples supra at notes 6–9. 
52.   E.g., DeMott, supra note 2, at 887–88; FitzGibbon, supra note 45; Smith, supra note 45, at 
1492. 
53.   See CALLIESS & ZUMBANSEN, supra note 20; Halliday & Shaffer, supra note 30. 
54.   This author conducted several searches in databases and search engines, to no avail. He 
concedes that this might be due to flawed research strategies. Even if someone has written on the 
subject–apologies–, the contribution at least has not made such an impact that it could be regarded as 
seminal literature accepted to provide the common wisdom for the field. 
55.   Mathias Lehmann, A Plea for a Transnational Approach to Arbitrability in Arbitral Practice, 42 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 753, 753–54, 763 (2004) (defining transnational law as “general principles 
of law that are recognized by a significant number of national laws” and demanding “converge[nce] on 
the same solution to a particular problem”); in the same vein and relying on Lehmann’s definitions, see 
Reza Dibadj, Panglossian Transnationalism, 44 STAN. J. INT’L L. 253, 289–97 (2008). 
56.   Russel A. Miller & Peer C. Zumbansen, Introduction – Comparative Law as Transnational Law, 
in COMPARATIVE LAW AS TRANSNATIONAL LAW: A DECADE OF THE GERMAN LAW JOURNAL 3 
(Russel A. Miller & Peer C. Zumbansen eds., 2011). 
57.   Mathias Reimann, Beyond National Systems: A Comparative Law in the International Age, 75 TUL. 
L. REV. 1103, 1115–19 (2001). Reimann’s approach did not generate a large following. See Boris N. 
Mamlyuk & Ugo Mattei, Comparative International Law, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 385, 424 (2011). In the 
ensuing ten years, to be fair, comparativists did not rush to engage with what Reimann called “vertical 
comparisons.” 
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In sum, this Article cannot rely on established wisdom, but has to take a stand 
on its own and explore the issue a little bit further. The starting point is a definition 
of transnational law accepted by the majority of authors working in the field. 
According to many pundits, it transcends national law, but is not international law–
or at least not limited to it.58 Additionally, there has to be some connection of the 
transnational norm to national law or national lawmaking.59 If transnational legal 
orders unfold through “the adoption, recognition, or enforcement of the norms” 
by legal institutions within multiple nation states,60 tracing these various instances 
of norm-acceptance must employ the conceptual apparatus of comparative law. As 
not all legal orders are alike, not even within one legal family, the means by which 
the process of norms being “uploaded” from or “downloaded” into national legal 
orders61 are unique to the environment they originate in or are received by. Different 
conceptions of public and private law, diverging boundaries of contract and tort62—
these and other rifts in the legal landscape inevitably lead to a broad variety of 
instruments and strategies for placing transnational norms within a given national 
legal order. Locating the transnational norm in question thus presupposes an 
exercise in comparative law and searching for functional equivalence of legal 
institutions.63 Institutions are comparable if they serve similar purposes (function) in 
the systems compared.64 A function, at least according to a popular definition in the 
comparatist’s methodological quiver, is the relation between institutions and 
problems.65 Therefore, one first has to nail down the problem which then may serve 
as the constant for the comparative work.66 
As a result, the fact that relevant relationships in civil law countries are 
governed wholly or in part by contract law does not take them out of the equation 
a priori. The heart of the problem lies in the question as to whether, e.g., the German 
contract law provisions serve the same purpose as the rules of fiduciary law in the 
United States or in England. Similitude or difference in remedies may well count as 
circumstantial evidence. From a methodological point of view, however, neither the 
one nor the other is decisive. Factual or purely descriptive methods do “not tell us 
 
58.   See, e.g., Halliday & Shaffer, supra note 30, at 4, 19; VIELLECHNER, supra note 28, at 167. 
59.   CALLIESS & ZUMBANSEN, supra note 20, at 110; Halliday & Shaffer, supra note 30, at 13. 
60.   Halliday & Shaffer, supra note 30, at 13. 
61.   Harold H. Koh, Why Transnational Law Matters, 24 PENN STATE INT’L L. REV. 745–46 
(2006). 
62.   Whereas German law knows a pre-contractual liability norm, the “culpa in contrahendo,” 
and puts it under a quasi-contractual roof, common law deals with similar situations under tort law (if 
at all), see, for example, the classical essay of Friedrich Kessler & Edith Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, 
Bargaining in Good Faith, and Freedom of Contract: A Comparative Study, 77 HARV. L. REV. 401 (1964). See 
Nadia E. Nedzel, A Comparative Study of Good Faith, Fair Dealing, and Precontractual Liability, 12 TUL. EUR. 
& CIVIL L. F. 97 (1997), for a more recent take. 
63.   See Michaels, supra note 32, for a (critical) review of the functional method in comparative 
law. 
64.   See Hugh Collins, Methods and Aims of Comparative Law, 11 OXFORD J. COMP. L. 396 (1991), 
and UWE KISCHEL, RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG, 93–94 (2015) (in German), for a strong commitment to 
the function method. 
65.   Michaels, supra note 32, at 371. 
66.   Id. 
2020]      TRANSNATIONAL FIDUCIARY LAW: SPACES AND ELEMENTS 59 
whether these [similarities or differences] are accidental or necessary, or how they 
relate to society.”67 They “simply” have to fulfill the same purpose.68 How this all 
plays out is shown in the next sub-section. 
C. Fiduciary Law in Civil Law Jurisdictions: Germany as a Case Study 
Even though the exact confines and definitions of a fiduciary relationship are 
still subject to a lively debate,69 nearly all theories agree on the core problem: the 
other-regarding powers conferred or taken by one person over another’s interests 
(broadly construed), combined with an element of discretion.70 In the language of 
law and economics, this gives rise to a principal-agent problem.71 The person having 
the interests in question, i.e. the principal, is vulnerable. They cannot sufficiently 
observe the agent’s actions and, in many situations, will lack the skill for monitoring 
the agent.72 That creates an opportunity to engage in opportunistic behavior or, in 
the famous phrase coined by Oliver Williamson, “self-interest seeking with guile.”73 
The agent may engage in hidden actions under conditions of moral hazard.74 They 
can, e.g., misappropriate assets belonging to the principal or act despite having a 
conflict of interests. This leads into the question as to whether and how a given legal 
systems addresses these risks. In the common law system, it is first and foremost 
the duty of loyalty. It prohibits incurring profits other than those agreed upon when 
the parties entered the relationship and requires the agent to avoid conflicts of 
interest.75 These “no conflict” and “no profit” rules build the fiduciary loyalty’s core 
in the common law.76 They serve as entry points for more specific duties such as to 
ask for consent in conflicted transactions and remedies such as disgorgement of 
 
67.   Id. at 369. 
68.   Dubious therefore Gelter & Helleringer, supra note 10, at 595–96. 
69.   Compare, to name just three recent attempts at a general definition and theory: Paul B. 
Miller, The Fiduciary Relationship, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 63 (Andrew 
S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014), developing a “fiduciary powers theory;” Smith, supra note 45, 
testing a “critical resource theory” and; Evan J. Criddle, Liberty in Loyalty: A Republican Theory of Fiduciary 
Law, 95 TEX. L. REV. 993 (2017). 
70.   See Paul B. Miller, The Identification of Fiduciary Relationships, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF FIDUCIARY LAW 367, 379 (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019). Critics interpret some instances of 
fiduciary relationships as lacking the element of discretion, for example, when an investment adviser is 
either not given discretionary power to act on their client’s behalf or refuses to assume discretion. See 
Arthur Laby, Book Review, 35 L. & PHIL. 123, 132–34 (2016) (reviewing PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014)). 
71.   See Robert H. Sitkoff, An Economic Theory of Fiduciary Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 197, 198 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014). 
72.   Id. at 199. 
73.   Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J. 
L. & ECON. 233, 234 n.3 (1979). 
74.   Sitkoff, supra note 71, at 199. 
75.   Andrew S. Gold, The Fiduciary of Loyalty, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 
385, 387, 389 (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019); Paul B. Miller, A Theory of Fiduciary Liability, 6 MCGILL 
L.J. 235, 257 (2011). See Sitkoff, supra note 71, at 201, from a law and economics point of view. 
76.   Gold, supra note 75, at 386. 
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profits.77 German law reacts to a similar set of real-world problems by means of 
functionally equivalent rules: 
Contracts between attorneys, investment advisors, tax consultants and their 
clients, distribution agreements (Vertriebshändlervertrag), commercial agency 
agreements (Handelsvertretervertrag), construction management contracts 
(Baubetreuungsvertrag), the duties of corporate directors vis-à-vis the corporation, 
duties of trustees in bankruptcy (Insolvenzverwalter) to creditors, to name but a few 
examples–they all create the problems sketched above. In these relationships, one 
person enjoys discretionary powers over the interests of another, followed by the 
danger of the agent acting opportunistically. In Germany, just as in other civil law 
countries, the knot tying these and comparable relationships together is primarily 
the mandate contract.78 
The German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch – “BGB”) provides default rules 
for an agreement to act on another person’s behalf79 in the shape of a mandate 
contract, (Auftrag)80 subjecting the agent to a regime of contract law rules governing, 
inter alia, the agent’s duty to notify the mandator if they want to deviate from 
instructions and then to wait for a decision,81 a duty to provide the mandator with 
information on the status of the transaction and, after carrying out the mandate, to 
render account for it,82 the disgorgement of profits,83 and a penalty in case the agent 
misappropriates assets under his management.84 Generally, it is an accepted (if 
 
77.   Id. at 387, 394. 
78.   See generally Gelter & Helleringer, supra note 10, at 588–90. 
79.   German law distinguishes the agent’s authority to act from the agreement to act between 
agent and principal. See BASIL S. MARKESINIS, HANNES UNBERATH & ANGUS JOHNSTON, THE 
GERMAN LAW OF CONTRACT: A COMPARATIVE TREATISE 109, 158 (2d ed. 2006). 
80.   The mandate contract is a contract in which one person takes on a duty to act on behalf of 
another without receiving remuneration. See MARKESINIS ET AL., supra note 79, at 158. 
81.   Section 665 of the BGB: “The mandatary is entitled to deviate from the instructions of the 
mandator if he may assume in the circumstances that the mandator would approve of such deviation if 
he were aware of the factual situation. The mandatary must make notification to the mandator prior to 
such deviation and must wait for the decision of the latter unless postponement entails danger.” 
BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER JUSTIZ AND FÜR VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ, https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.html#p2934 (last visited Oct. 15, 2019). 
82.   Section 666 of the BGB: “The mandatary is obliged to provide the mandator with the 
required reports, and on demand to provide information on the status of the transaction and after 
carrying out the mandate to render account for it.” BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER JUSTIZ UND FÜR 
VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ, https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.html#p293 
4  (last visited Oct. 15, 2019). 
83.   Section 667 of the BGB: “The mandatary is obliged to return to the mandator everything 
he receives to perform the mandate and what he obtains from carrying out the transaction.” 
BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER JUSTIZ AND FÜR VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ, https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.html#p2934 (last visited Oct. 15, 2019). See also Graziadei, 
supra note 33, at 287, 295 (discussing disgorgement of profits under civil law). 
84.   BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 668, translated in 
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.html#p2934 (last visited Oct. 15, 
2019) (Ger.) (“If the mandatary spends money for himself that he must return to the mandator or spend 
for the mandator, then he is obliged to pay interest on it from the time of spending onwards.”).  
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unwritten) basic rule that the agent has to put the principal’s interests before their 
own and avoid conflicts of interest.85 
These rules are not important owing to the significance of the mandate 
contract in itself, but because they form a nucleus other provisions piggyback on. 
One example is section 675(1) of the BGB, a linchpin of German contract law 
regulating what – reluctantly – may be called agency agreements:86 
Nongratuitous management of the affairs of another 
(1) The provisions of sections 663, 665 to 670 and 672 to 674 apply to a service 
contract or a contract to produce a work dealing with the management of the affairs 
of another to the extent that nothing else is provided in this subtitle and, if the 
person obliged is entitled to terminate without complying with a notice period, the 
provisions of section 671 (2) also apply with the necessary modifications. 
This–if read out of context admittedly slightly cryptic–piece of legislation 
contains an essential set of duties. An agreement in the sense of section 675(1) of 
the BGB is a contract for services or work and labor in exchange for remuneration. 
“[D]ealing with the management of the affairs of another” is understood by the 
BGH, the Federal Court in private law matters, as an independent activity87 of an 
economic character88 on behalf of another within a foreign89 sphere of interest.90 
This section does not define the duties applying to agency agreements, but refers to 
provisions of the mandate contract, inter alia those governing notification and 
information duties and disgorgement of profits. Moreover, the agent is subject to a 
duty of loyalty, which is deemed to be the decisive characteristic distinguishing a 
Geschäftsbesorgungsvertrag from other contracts, e.g. regular service contracts and 
contracts for work and labor.91 
German scholars observe that Geschäftsbesorgungsverträge fit well into concepts 
of economic contract theory and demand a specific set of duties in order to counter 
 
85.   Michael Martinek & Sebastian Omlor, in STAUDINGER, KOMMENTAR ZUM 
BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH, BUCH 2, VORBEMERKUNGEN ZU §§ 662 ff margin no. 28 (14th ed. 
2017).  
86.   “Reluctantly” because of the content any common lawyer will immediately think of in 
connection with agency. Although there is an overlap of agency agreements in the common law and 
those of the German civil law variety as to content, significant differences remain, such as the difference 
between the authority to act and the agreement to act. See MARKESINIS ET AL., supra note 79, at 158–
60. See also BGB § 675(1), translated in https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb 
/englisch_bgb.html#p2934 (last visited Oct. 15, 2019). 
87.   As opposed to an employment relationship. 
88.   In contrast to a mandate in the sense of section 662 of the BGB, which is a similar contract 
without consideration. Additionally, this criterion excludes contracts related to activities traditionally 
considered having a non-economic purpose from section 675’s scope, e.g. contracts between doctors 
and patients, teacher and pupil, and artists and “customer.” See Martinek & Omlor, supra note 85, § 675 
margin no. A 16. 
89.   As opposed to one’s own sphere of interest. 
90.   See, e.g., Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 25, 1966, 45 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFS IN ZIVILSACHEN [BGHZ] 223 (228) (Ger.). 
91.   Christoph Benicke, in SOERGEL, 10 BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH MIT 
EINFÜHRUNGSGESETZ UND NEBENGESETZEN (BGB) § 675 margin no. 5 (13th ed. 2011); Klaus J. 
Hopt, Interessenwahrung und Interessenkonflikte im Aktien-, Bank- und Berufsrecht, 33 ZGR 1, 20 (2004). 
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the various problems discussed under the rubric of agency theory and in the 
incomplete contracts literature.92 The rules governing mandate contracts and agency 
agreements address exactly those problems fiduciary law reacts to in the United 
States. Therefore, from a functional point of view, it is completely legitimate to 
categorize the German contract law provisions just discussed as fiduciary law from 
a comparative perspective.93 The mandate contract, however, is not the only way to 
establish a fiduciary relationship and a duty of loyalty. In addition to contract law, 
other parts of German law also provide for fiduciary obligations. 
Examples already mentioned in this article’s introduction are the relationship 
between guardian and ward94 and the trustee in bankruptcy (Insolvenzverwalter).95 A 
director on the executive board of a public corporation (Vorstand der 
Aktiengesellschaft) owes specific fiduciary duties to the corporation itself. These duties 
are not grounded in the employment contract, but in the corporate relationship of 
the director and the corporation.96 Moreover, public law enriches and subjects 
several relationships to a special fiduciary law regime, even though the parties are 
bound by contract, as is the case with regard to investment advisors97 and 
attorneys98 towards their clients. Several courts and authors even underscore that 
fiduciary duties are stricter than those flowing from the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing,99 echoing the well-known adage coined by Judge Cardozo who 
famously expected a trustee to show the “punctilio of an honor the most 
sensitive.”100 Even though the relationships just mentioned are not mandate 
contracts in terms of legal doctrine, this does not mean that the trustee in 
bankruptcy or a guardian enjoys the privilege of a more lenient regime. Either the 
relevant specific regulations contain supplementary rules or courts draw from the 
rules governing mandate contracts by analogy. 
 
92.   Kuntz, supra note 5, at 766; see also CHRISTOPH KUMPAN, DER INTERESSENKONFLIKT IM 
DEUTSCHE PRIVATRECHT 59–63 (Mohr Siebeck Tübingen, 2014) (discussing in the context of conflicts 
of interests); Martinek & Omlor, supra note 85, VORBEM ZU §§ 662 ff margin no. 77. 
93.   Kuntz, supra note 5, at 766. 
94.   BGHZ, supra note 6; RUSCH, supra note 6; Zimmerman, supra note 6. 
95.   BGHZ, supra note 7; BECKER, supra note 7. 
96.   See, e.g., Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Feb. 20, 1995, 129 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFS IN ZIVILSACHEN [BGHZ] 30 (34) (Ger.); 1 
HOLGER FLEISCHER, KOMMENTAR ZUM AKTIENGESETZ § 93 margin no. 117 (Gerald Spindler & 
Eberhard Stilz eds., 4th ed. 2019). 
97.   See Wertpapierhandelsgesetz [WpHG] [German Securities Trading Act] § 63(1) 
(“Investment firms shall be required to provide investment services and ancillary services honestly, 
candidly and with the requisite degree of expertise, care and diligence in the best interests of their 
clients.”) (Thilo Kuntz trans. 2020); see also Hopt, supra note 91, at 1, 6–8; KUMPAN, supra note 92, at 
119–21. 
98.   Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Court of Appeal] Brandenburg, Mar. 5, 2012, Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift – Rechtsprechungsreport [NJW-RR] 1191 (1193) (Ger.). 
99.   See Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Nov. 18, 2019, DIE 
AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT [AG] 462, 463, 2011 (Ger.); FLEISCHER, supra note 96, § 93 margin no. 115. 
100.   Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464 (1928). 
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The no-profit rule may serve as an example: in cases where no express 
reference is made to this rule, courts apply the relevant section 667 of the BGB101 
by way of analogy, e.g. in case of a guardian letting entailed land after receiving a 
“commission”102 or an insolvency trustee holding monies in an escrow account on 
behalf of the debtor.103 Should the fiduciary engage in illegal competition, German 
law provides another set of norms serving as no-profit rule, e.g. in section 88 of the 
German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz) with respect to the board of directors 
of a stock corporation (Aktiengesellschaft).104 These and other prohibitions to engage 
in competition with the principal are also applied analogously, e.g. to the directors 
of a limited liability company (Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung)105 or a trustee in 
bankruptcy appropriating the debtor’s corporate opportunities.106 
In the end, German contract law and other legal institutions address problems 
arising out of relationships in which one party enjoys other-regarding powers over 
another’s interests, combined with an element of discretion. From a comparative 
perspective, this establishes the functional equivalence of these solutions to the 
common law approach. That means that the differences between equity-based 
common fiduciary law and German civil law, as significant as they are in general, do 
not stand in the way of the current project. Given the same set of problems both 
civil law and common law have to solve, the differences in the regulatory 
“technique” are irrelevant as far as the establishment of transnational law is 
concerned. Everyone knows that many, if not all, roads lead to Rome. 
III. SPACES OF TRANSNATIONAL FIDUCIARY LAW 
Transnational law exists in different spaces107 and so does transnational 
fiduciary law. Notwithstanding the ubiquity of fiduciary law, there is no “world” or 
“global” fiduciary law, as will be discussed in Sub-section 3. Legal ordering of 
 
101.   See supra note 83. 
102.   Reichsgericht [RG] [Federal Court of Justice] May 30, 1940, 164 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES 
REICHSGERICHTS IN ZIVILSACHEN [RGZ] 98 (103) (Ger.). 
103.   BGH Dec. 15, 2011, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR INSOLVENZRECHT [NZI] 135 (136), 2012 
(Ger.).  
104.   Aktiengesetz [AktG] [German Stock Corporation Act] § 88 (Ger.) (“(1) Members of the 
executive board may not engage in any trade or enter any transactions in the line of the corporation’s 
business without prior approval by the supervisory board. They may not be member of another 
corporation’s executive board, director of a limited liability company or general partner of another 
commercial enterprise. [. . .]; (2) The corporation may claim damages from a member of the executive 
board who violates this prohibition. In lieu thereof, the corporation may require said member to treat 
any transaction made on his own behalf as if he had acted on behalf of the corporation and deliver up 
any remuneration received for actions on behalf of another, or assign his rights to such remuneration. 
(3) [. . .].” (2) The corporation may claim damages from a member of the executive board who violates 
this prohibition. In lieu thereof, the corporation may require said member to treat any transaction made 
on his own behalf as if he had acted on behalf of the corporation and deliver up any remuneration 
received for actions on behalf of another, or assign his rights to such remuneration. (3) [. . .].” (Thilo 
Kuntz trans. 2020). 
105.   BGH Oct. 26, 1964, WERTPAPIERMITTEILUNGEN [WM] 1320 (1321), 1964 (Ger.). 
106.   BGH Mar. 16, 2017, WERTPAPIERMITTEILUNGEN [WM] 776 (779), 2017 (Ger.). 
107.   See Halliday & Shaffer, supra note 30, at 18–19. 
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fiduciary law rather occurs in two dimensions. Entanglement of national laws can 
entail the emergence of transnational legal orders on the horizontal level (Sub-
section 1.). On the vertical plane, norms created “beyond the state” may trickle 
down into national legal systems either because legislators and courts transform 
them in national laws or actors make use of them in enforcing rights and remedies 
(Sub-section 2.). 
A. Horizontal Transnational Ordering of Fiduciary Law 
The horizontal transnational ordering of fiduciary law is a consequence of 
several national legal orders becoming entangled through norms flowing back and 
forth between the respective systems. Notwithstanding, this claim rests on a non-
trivial premise; namely, the assumption that national law can provide a basis for 
transnational legal ordering. Considering national law’s uncertain status in 
transnational legal theory, this is a point in need of some elaboration as a first step 
(a]). Having cleared the ground, a second step then helps to chart the territory, 
taking up the example of the diffusion of the trust as a legal institution in East Asia 
(b]). 
1. National Law’s Uncertain Status in Transnational Legal Theory 
Workers in the vineyard of transnational legal theory have long been 
underlining that transnational law has a distinctive geographic component.108 
Contrary to traditional national law, it reaches beyond the nation-state and expands 
beyond the confines of a legally defined territory and scope of application–
international private law excluded for a moment.109 Its extension varies110 and 
remains to be determined case by case, depending on the market participants, 
legislators, courts, and other institutions applying and subjecting themselves to 
transnational law.111 Pointing this out, many scholars conclude that transnational 
orders vary in geographic scope.112 This geographic approach is rooted in the idea 
of transnational law being based on norms “beyond” the nation state as a starting 
point. Building their theories on normative arrangements like the contract models 
typically collected under the umbrella term lex mercatoria,113 the overwhelming 
majority of writers, while stressing the importance of national laws,114 take this as a 
 
108.   See id. at 18–19, 28. See also Shaffer, supra note 20, at 232. 
109.   That is not to say that national law never can have extraterritorial reach, to the contrary. 
But as this is the exception rather than the rule, this issue does not alter the thrust of the argument 
developed above. On the status of international private law, see text cited infra note 124. 
110.   Halliday & Shaffer, supra note 30, at 18. 
111.   Id. at 12–13. 
112.   Id. at 18–19. 
113.   See supra note 32 and accompanying text. For a broader view, see, for example, Halliday 
& Shaffer, supra note 30, at 13–15. 
114.   CALLIESS & ZUMBANSEN, supra note 20, at 19; Glenn, supra note 27, at 839; Halliday & 
Shaffer, supra note 30, at 13. 
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given.115 Whatever their respective position on what transnational law actually “is” 
may be, these scholars–at least implicitly–carve out orders exclusively based on 
national laws. 
At first glance, this strategy of erecting a dichotomy not only provides for a 
definition of transnational law which proves to be manageable in research, but also 
sensibly divides labor between transnational law on the one hand and comparative 
law on the other. Just having two or more national legal orders look alike does not 
imply norms reverberating across borders and beyond the nation state. Legal 
transplants are not transnational law either, at least according to the traditions of 
the profession.116 Even though such repotting of a legal rule or legal institution from 
one national system and into another national bed refers to a border-crossing 
movement, the issue is not so much the creation of an additional point of reference. 
The question is rather whether the receiving system accepts or rejects the transplant. 
Legal transplants thus appear “as elements of local law reform.”117 Even though 
transnational law cannot forego exercises in comparative law,118 the latter remains 
reduced to the status of an auxiliary discipline to the former. Methodologically 
speaking, comparative law does not gain anything or grow just by being employed 
for the purposes of the transnational enterprise. 
And still, there is a curious ambiguity in many established narratives on how 
transnational law comes into being and which role national law may play. One does 
well to bring to mind that riding the transnational train does not add value in 
generating another substantive body of norms. What makes the voyage worth the 
while is the methodological aspect of giving process pride of place.119 Theorizing 
transnational legal ordering moves the “construction, flow . . . and settlement of 
legal norms”120 into the spotlight and helps to understand how the production of 
national laws interacts with “different levels of social organization, from the 
transnational to the local”, e.g. “the migration across borders, . . . contestation and 
homologies among the transnational, national, and local levels.”121 
 
115.   See, e.g., CALLIESS & ZUMBANSEN, supra note 20, at 63 (noting “contested relationship 
between lex mercatoria and the state legal order”); Terence C. Halliday & Pavel Osinsky, Globalization of 
Law, 32 ANN. REV. SOC. 447, 450 (2006); Halliday & Shaffer, supra note 30, at 12; VIELLECHNER, supra 
note 28, at 180–85. 
116.   A couple of authors beg to differ, see, e.g., Jonathan Wiener, Something Borrowed for Something 
Blue: Legal Transplants and the Evolution of Global Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1295 (2001); Anna 
Dolidze, Bridging Comparative and International Law: Amicus Curiae Participation as a Vertical Legal Transplant, 
26 EUR. J. INT’L L. 851 (2015). 
117.   Ralf Michaels, State Law as a Transnational Legal Order, 1 UC IRVINE J. INT’L. TRANSNT’L. 
& COMP. L. 141, 148 (2016). 
118.   Supra II.2. 
119.   Halliday & Shaffer, supra note 30, at 37–38; Harold Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 
NEB. L. REV. 181, 183–84 (1996); Shaffer, supra note 20, at 237; Peer Zumbansen, Where the Wild Things 
Are: Journeys to Transnational Legal Orders, and Back, 1 UC IRVINE J. INT’L. TRANSN’L. & COMP. L. 161, 
166 (2016). The extent to which these views are all purely procedural is subject to debate. See, e.g., 
Halliday & Shaffer, supra note 30; Michaels, supra note 117, at 144. See JESSUP, supra note 21, at 2, for a 
differing view, putting emphasis on substantive law rather than process. 
120.   Shaffer, supra note 20, at 237. 
121.   Id. 
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Nation states create “true” legal norms in the sense of classical legal theory. 
Consequently, contrary to what is the case concerning norms of transnational law, 
the theoretical puzzle to ponder is not normativity in a legal sense,122 but this: if 
several nation states generate trust law, and this process of norm production is 
interdependent, because legislators and courts of each of the states look at what the 
other is doing, does this not also constitute transnational law? After all, transnational 
law is “transnational” not because of the norm-giving involved or because the 
norm-producing institutions are non-state actors, but because of its reach in terms 
of geography.123 
In a more recent turn of events, a group of scholars has already started moving 
into this direction, grounding their approach in international private law.124 
(National) international private law, so their argument goes, “engage[s] institutions 
in foreign states, too.”125 Stressing the political–and therefore regulatory–nature of 
international private law,126 these authors conclude that international private law 
and cross-border litigation engender transnational (private) law.127 National law can 
also turn into transnational law, or so some propose, through national judges 
developing common private international law principles.128 
Delving into the debate’s details is not of interest for the purposes of this 
text.129 What is of interest, however, is the fact that scholars are able to attribute 
international private law–state law–to a popular definition of transnational legal 
orders. To this author’s mind, this undergirds the conjecture of conventional 
accounts of transnational law having blind spots with respect to the “transnational 
potential” of national laws. Entanglement of national laws is another entity, highly 
relevant for fiduciary law, as will be argued in the next sub-section. 
2. Transnationalization Through Entanglement of National Laws 
The starting point for the following discussion of the meaning and 
consequences of entanglement is the diffusion of trust law in East Asia (a). The legal 
systems of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and China have a civil law core. 
Nevertheless, Japan introduced the trust as a legal institution, which then spread 
over East Asia for various reasons. It would be a mistake, however, to qualify this 
as a problem of transplanting law from one national legal system to another. Doing 
 
122.   On this problem, see Halliday & Shaffer, supra note 30, at 11. 
123.   Michaels, supra note 117, at 154. 
124.   See, e.g., Michaels, supra note 117; Robert Wai, Transnational Law and Private Ordering in a 
Contested Global Society, 46 HARV. INT’L L. J. 471 (2005). 
125.   Michaels, supra note 117, at 153. 
126.   E.g. Wai, supra note 124, at 473. 
127.   See Michaels, supra note 117; Wai, supra note 124. 
128.   Craig Scott, “Transnational Law” as Proto-Concept: Three Conceptions, 10 GER. L. J. 859, 870–
71 (2009); see also Shaffer, supra note 20, at 244 (“legal Esperanto”). 
129.   Apart from the question if the analysis in general stands up to closer scrutiny, there is a 
further debate within that group whether in addition to the rules of international private law the 
applicable substantive law should be part of transnational law as well. See Michaels, supra note 117, at 
153. 
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so would seriously neglect the fact that these East Asian countries’ laws are in many 
ways connected and intertwined. As a consequence, to truly understand trust law in 
East Asia—and with it large portions of fiduciary law—presupposes an 
understanding of the trajectories these national legal orders share. Building on the 
case study of trust law in East Asia, the section moves forward by exploring the 
consequences for transnational fiduciary law more generally in part b). It constructs 
the theoretical framework for understanding how entanglement and histoire croisée 
establish a process of transnationalization. 
a. Introductory Example: The Diffusion of Trust Law in East Asia 
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and China not only share a rich history as a 
region,130 they also share a common legal framework as they are all civil law 
jurisdictions with strong historical roots in the German civil code (Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch).131 As a consequence, these East Asian countries not only lack equity 
courts, but are historically situated within a framework built around the concept of 
single ownership running counter to a core element of trust architecture: dual 
ownership.132 This distinguishes them from their common law siblings: Hong 
Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia.133 Nevertheless, after the Secured Bond Trust Act 
of 1905 was introduced as a piece of specific legislation, Japan followed through 
with the enactment of the Trust Business Act of 1922.134 As part of its colonial rule 
over Taiwan, acquired from China in 1895, and Korea, annexed in 1910,135 Japan 
imposed its trust legislation.136 China, the latest addition to the East Asian civil law 
and trust family, included the trust as an institution only after the Opening Up policy 
implemented by Deng Xiaoping in 1979, the legal institution based on the Trust Act 
entered into force only in 2001.137 Both Taiwan and South Korea kept the trust after 
Japanese colonial rule ended.138 What did not end, however, was the influence of 
Japanese trust law. Given its status as the root of modern trust regulation in these 
two jurisdictions, it still oftentimes served as a pacesetter for Taiwanese and South 
 
130.   See CHARLES HOLCOMBE, A HISTORY OF EAST ASIA (2d ed. 2017). 
131.   See Lusina Ho & Rebecca Lee, Reception of the trust in Asia: an[sic] historical perspective, in TRUST 
LAW IN ASIAN CIVIL LAW JURISDICTIONS 10–11 (Ho and Lee eds., 2013). China did not directly adopt 
and adapt German law, but took it over from the Soviet legal system. Lusina Ho, Trust laws in China, in 
RE-IMAGINING THE TRUST: TRUSTS IN CIVIL LAW 183 (Lionel Smith ed., 2010).  
132.   See Lusina Ho, The Reception of Trust in Asia: Emerging Asian Principles of Trust, 2004 SING J. 
LEGAL STUD. 287, 289 (2004). 
133.   Ho & Lee, supra note 131, at 10. 
134.   See Tamaruya, supra note 47, at 2231, for a detailed description of the Japanese reception 
of trusts and trust law. 
135.   See HOLCOMBE, supra note 130, at 273 (on Korea); id. at 384 (on Taiwan), for a concise 
introduction into this period of East Asian history and Japanese imperialism. 
136.   Tamaruya, supra note 47, at 2242. 
137.   On the trust in China see, e.g., Ho, supra note 131; Charles Zhen Qu, The Doctrinal Basis of 
the Trust Principles in China’s Trust Law, 38 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 345 (2003); see also Tamaruya, supra 
note 47, at 2245; HOLCOMBE, supra note 130, at 369 (on the Opening Up policy). 
138.   Ho & Lee, supra note 131, at 12; Tamaruya, supra note 47, at 2246. 
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Korean trust law and exercises some influence on the 2001 Chinese legislation.139 
At the same time, the trust laws of the group members echo US models on trust.140 
The implementation of a common law institution into a jurisdiction with a 
solid civil law background led to shared problems and points of departure for 
doctrinal development. There is no constructive trust on traceable assets.141 
Additionally, even though there are functional equivalents of the duty of loyalty in 
the respective trust laws, the content and extent of these rules awaits further 
clarification compared to their common law counterparts.142 Reviewing these 
common points of departure, it comes as no surprise to find solutions closely 
resembling each other.143 
Bearing in mind the historical development of trust legislation of the “East 
Asian Four” means that a traditional comparative approach is not enough. The 
individual legal orders do not simply stand alongside each either nor did they each 
on their own “simply” accept a legal transplant which now becomes part of the 
national body of law.144 They rather interlace on several levels and form a discernible 
space of trust law and fiduciary regulation. Trust legislation in South Korea, China, 
Taiwan, or Japan moves also with a view to the respective other(s). Comparative 
studies typically neglect this element of interaction and the accompanying echo-
chamber effect. This case leads to a challenging methodological issue: does the 
obvious and persistent connection between national laws and national legal 
institutions give rise to a transnational legal order, even though there is no set of 
rules or standards “produced by, or in conjunction with, a legal organization or 
network that transcends or spans the nation-state”?145 As will be shown below, the 
answer is affirmative. 
b. Entanglement, Histoire Croisée and Transnational Legal Spaces 
The evolution of the legal frameworks over time and the historical 
intersections generated what historians writing about transnational history term 
 
139.   See Tamaruya, supra note 47, at 2246. 
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142.   Id. at 297; see Tamaruya, supra note 47, at 2251, for a more detailed analysis; see also infra 
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143.   See also infra IV.3. 
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145.   Halliday & Shaffer, supra note 30, at 12. 
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histoires connectées,146 connected histories,147 and histoire croisée.148 Moving forward 
from comparative history, these scholars put emphasis on the element of interaction 
and echo-chamber effects resulting from shared narratives and histories.149 With 
this changed perspective comes an interest not in the merger of institutions or 
hybridizations of formerly singular institutions, but in how the crossings affect the 
parties involved and create something new.150 What historians working in this 
methodology’s ambit want to achieve is a transnational view on history, not by 
adding another layer on top of regional, local or national history, but rather through 
readjusting the focus on how the interaction and connections came into being, 
which specific logic lies behind them, and how they structure space.151 Apparently, 
there is something unique in these histoires croisées worth looking at in its own right. 
All the issues and vantage points just mentioned surface in East Asian trust 
regulation, making it a fine example for a transnational phenomenon. 
A historian researching the entangled developments and evolution of trust law 
and trust-related fiduciary law in East Asia has to retrace the “construction, flow . . 
. and settlement of legal norms,”  the production of national laws and the latter’s 
interaction with “different levels of social organization, from the transnational to 
the local,”  including “the migration across borders, . . . contestation and homologies 
among the transnational, national, and local levels.”152 This is where histoire croisée 
and transnational legal theory meet. Even though historical methods do not operate 
in the shadow of questions of legal normativity, historians grapple with issues 
surprisingly similar to what legal scholars have to deal with. Conventional 
comparative history and comparative law both follow a static approach and tend to 
neglect interactive processes. Insofar, historical methodology undergirds the claim 
that the entanglement of national laws may constitute transnational law. It adds a 
vertical dimension to comparative law’s horizontal plane.153 Paying close attention 
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70 UCI JRNL. OF INT’L, TRANSNATIONAL, & COMP. L. [Vol.  5:47 
to how norms gain transnational character according to leading legal theorists 
proves the point. 
Transnational norms are norms “adapted transnationally.”154 They do not 
necessarily have to originate outside the nation state.155 Transnational legal orders 
are transnational if they (at least) have social effects in more than one jurisdiction156 
and “engage legal institutions within multiple nation-states.” 157 The ways in which 
legal institutions engage with the norms—bottom-up, top-down, or horizontally—
does not matter, at least not for their qualification as parts of transnational legal 
orders, because the concept of transnational law comprises processes in all 
directions.158 What is important is that multiple nation states lace into each other as 
a consequence of recognizing norms with an international scope.159 Law enacted by 
a foreign state and then transplanted into and adapted to the needs of another nation 
state’s legal system fits the description of “rules of extrastate origin.” From the 
transplanting nation state, this foreign state law is just as non-binding as any model 
law or framework drafted by an international organization or informal network of 
private actors. Furthermore, leading theorists increasingly point out the importance 
of persuasive authority in transnational law, such as engagement with and references 
to foreign law and judicial opinions.160 According to these criteria, trust regulation 
in Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and China spawns transnational fiduciary law insofar 
as trust law contains fiduciary norms. 
Critics might ask what is added by the transnational approach as developed in 
the preceding sections. The answer is the answer given by many scholars of 
transnational legal theory: it shows the flow, diffusion and construction of norms 
across national borders, fostering a deeper understanding of the process of 
lawmaking in a globalized world.161 
B. Vertical Transnational Ordering of Fiduciary Law 
The vertical transnational legal ordering involves norms, as some scholars 
succinctly put it, “downloaded” from a domain beyond the nation state into national 
legal systems or “uploaded, then downloaded.”162 In the course of their voyage, 
norms created by non-state actors may gain normative force comparable to state 
law. This is one of the basic insights of transnational legal theory, not only true for 
lex mercatoria,163 but also for fiduciary norms. Given that the floating of norms stands 
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at the center of transnational legal theory,164 the following section can forego 
another exercise in theorizing transnational law. Instead, it explores the issue based 
on a case study centering on fiduciary law. Specifically, it discusses the potential of 
transnational legal ordering in the area of environmental, social and (corporate) 
governance (ESG) matters165 in corporate law.166 ESG regulation unfolds normative 
force from a socio-legal perspective. This is true even for the United States, 
regardless of critiques pointing to the requirements of national law. Standards and 
principles on ESG relevant for corporate law have been floating around for a while 
now (Sub-section a). Even though they are “soft law,” ( i.e., not law in the sense of 
classical positivist accounts of law) these norms find their way into national legal 
systems, either by way of legislation or through enforcement by private actors (Sub-
section b).167 
1. Standards and Principles 
Two important international organizations, the United Nations (UN) and the 
OECD, have been setting standards for corporate law and corporate fiduciaries for 
quite a while now. The UN Environment Program joined with more than 200 
private institutions to form the UNEP Finance Initiative (UNEP/FI),168 which 
delivered a report on “Fiduciary Duty for the 21st Century” in 2015169–a follow-up 
on an earlier report delivered in 2005.170 The report lays out a framework under 
which it would be not only legal to take ESG-matters into account, but which even 
requires fiduciaries to pay attention to ESG. A broader perspective is employed by 
the 2011 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UN Guiding 
Principles), holding business enterprises obliged to respect human rights.171 These 
UN Guiding Principles aver that the responsibility to respect human rights “is a 
global standard of expected conduct for all business enterprises wherever they 
operate.” According to the UN Guiding Principles, this responsibility “exists 
independently of States’ abilities and/or willingness to fulfill their own human rights 
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obligations and does not diminish those obligations.” The guideline commentary 
positions it “over and above compliance with national laws and regulations 
protecting human rights.”172 The G20/OECD 2015 principles on corporate 
governance recommend that corporate boards should take stakeholder interests 
into account.173 
2. Normative Effects of Non-binding Rules 
Notwithstanding the purported softness and the non-binding character of the 
rules alluded to in the beginning of this section, it would be a mistake to discard 
them as politics or mere wishes of non-governmental actors, thereby carving them 
out of transnational fiduciary law. They are highly influential in shaping practice and 
legislation, especially in the last twenty years and increasingly so after the financial 
crisis of 2007/2008. As a consequence, they stand at the beginning of what appears 
now as the emergence of a transnational legal order. It is somewhat beside the point 
to argue that actions like a self-commitment to invest in line with ESG standards of 
various sorts of “soft law” run counter to actual law requiring directors to maximize 
shareholder wealth. Clearly, Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.’s174 progeny seems to prove 
these critics right, especially its modern Delaware offspring.175 Two things have to 
be borne in mind, however. Regardless of the “strictly legal point of view,” the 
critique carries only so far. It does not reach beyond state law pursuing the Delaware 
take on corporate directors’ fiduciary duties. Many jurisdictions outside the United 
States do follow a different path, among them major economies like France176 and 
Germany,177 to name but two.178 Even in the United States, a number of state 
corporate laws establish a stakeholder-oriented model of corporate governance, 
which at least makes it possible to take stakeholder-interests into account on the 
same footing with those of the shareholders.179 
Three examples may help to undergird the general claim expressed above that 
“soft law” on ESG exercises a normative thrust which has to be reckoned with, 
both from a more technical legal perspective and as a matter of socio-legal impact.180 
 
172.   Id. at 13. 
173.   OECD, supra note 18, at 46. 
174.   204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
175.   See, e.g., eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010). See Brett 
McDonnell, The Corrosion Critique of Benefit Corporations, 1, 18 (Sept. 9, 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=3450747&download=yes (last accessed Oct. 
15, 2019), for a recent review of the Delaware case law. 
176.   See infra i. 
177.   See, e.g., Jens Koch, Commentary on the German Stock Corporation Act, in AKTIENGESETZ, § 
76 margin no. 30 (Uwe Hüffer & Jens Koch, 13th ed., 2018). 
178.   On the many twists and turns in the UK, for example, Marc T. Moore, Shareholder primacy, 
labour and the historic ambivalence of UK company law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE HISTORY OF 
CORPORATE AND COMPANY LAW 142 (Harwell Wells ed., 2018). 
179.   See McDonnell, supra note 175, at 8, 16. 
180.   See, e.g., OECD, supra note 18, at 11 (“The Principles are widely used as a benchmark by 
individual jurisdictions around the world. They are also one of the Financial Stability Board’s Key 
Standards for Sound Financial Systems and provide the basis for assessment of the corporate 
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The first example relates to recent French legislation on corporate law, the loi 
PACTE (Sub-section i]); the second one to ESG-disclosure rules in the EU (Sub-
section ii]), and the third to acknowledgment through enforcement of rights and 
remedies and the exercise of power (Sub-section iii]). 
a. The French “Loi PACTE” 
One example is the French law on the growth and the transformation of 
businesses,181 known in shorter form as the loi PACTE.182 It contains, inter alia, new 
provisions on fiduciary duties.183 Pursuant to the reformed article 1833 of the 
French Code Civil, a corporation has to be managed in its social interest, taking into 
consideration its activities’ social and environmental effects,184 replacing the old 
focus on the common interest of the shareholders.185 PACTE relies to a 
considerable extent on the Notat-Sénard report,186 prepared by two high-profile 
individuals–one representing an ESG- and Union-perspective (Nicole Notat), the 
other “big business” (Jean-Dominique Sénard).187 Notat and Sénard explain their 
ESG-led reform proposals, inter alia, with reference to UN frameworks.188 Even 
though these and other international guidelines and principles are not the sole 
reason or even the main driving force behind the French bill, they serve as an 
important reference point and anchor linking national French law and transnational 
perspectives. PACTE firmly integrates these into national legislation and corporate 
fiduciary law. 
 
governance component of the Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes of the World 
Bank.”). 
181.   LOI NO 2019-486 DU 22 MAI 2019 RELATIVE A LA CROISSANCE ET LA TRANSFORMATION 
DES ENTREPRISES, J. OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE (May 23, 2019), 
https://www.cjoint.com/do c/19_  05/IExhRKuGrQh_joe-20190523-0119-0002.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 15, 2019). 
182.   “PACTE” is an acronym for the “plan d’action pour la croissance et la transformation des 
entreprises”, a plan developed by the French government to give business the means to innovate, to 
transform, to grow and to create jobs (“donner aux entreprises les moyens d’innover, de se transformer, 
de grandir et de créer des emplois”). La loi PACTE adoptée par le Parlement, REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE, 
https://www.economie.gouv.fr/plan-entreprises-pacte (last accessed Oct. 15, 2019). 
183.   See Pierre-Henri Conac, The Reform of Articles 1833 on Social Interest and 1835 on the Purpose of 
the Company of the French Civil Code: Recognition or Revolution?, in 1 FESTSCHRIFT FÜR KARSTEN SCHMIDT 
ZUM 80, for an overview in English. 
184.   “La société est gérée dans son intérêt social, en prenant en considération les enjeux sociaux 
et environnementaux de son activité.” 
185.   Conac, supra note 183, at 231. “Replace” concerns mainly the wording, in essence that 
stakeholder approach has long been the French law of the land. See id. at 230. 
186.   Nicole Notat & Jean-Dominique Sénard, L’entreprise, object d’interêt collectif, MINISTRES DE 
LA TRANSITION ECOLOGIQUE ET SOLIDAIRE, DE LA JUSTICE, DE L’ÉCONOMIE ET DES FINANCES DU 
TRAVAIL (Mar. 9, 2018), https://www.vie-publique.fr/sites/default/files/rapport/pdf/184000133.pdf 
(last accessed Oct. 15, 2019) [hereinafter Notat-Sénard Report]. On the influence of this report, see, 
Conac, supra note 183, at 231 (“The Notat-Sénard report [. . .] served as the “intellectual” basis for the 
PACTE Bill”). 
187.   Nicole Notat is president of Vigeo Eiris, a rating firm specializing on ESG and former 
head of the Union CFDT, Jean-Dominique Sénard was the CEO of Michelin at the time the report was 
delivered. 
188.   See Notat-Sénard Report, supra note 186, at 34, 41. 
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b. EU ESG-reporting Standards 
EU law requires large companies to disclose certain information on the way 
they operate and manage social and environmental challenges.189 The relevant 
Directive 2014/95/EU goes back to a strategy paper of the EU Commission.190 It 
grounds its policy approach, inter alia, in the UN Guiding Principles, qualifying 
them to be one element of “authoritative guidance . . . provided by internationally 
recognised[sic] principles and guidelines” and belonging to a “core set of 
internationally recognised[sic] principles and guidelines represents an evolving and 
recently strengthened global framework for CSR [i.e., corporate and social 
responsibility].”191 Companies subject to the Directive’s reporting and disclosure 
regime may rely on international frameworks in order to structure their non-
financial disclosure document,192 among them the UN Guiding Principles.193 The 
EU regulation partly builds on a French role model on ESG reporting, enacted in 
its earliest form in 2001.194 Even if these reporting requirements, as the more 
reserved-minded argue, are just that and not fiduciary duties in the narrow sense, 
fiduciaries still have to explain themselves.195 Whereas this might not affect the legal 
grid of the fiduciary’s obligations directly, the normative expectations it has to cater 
to will change. This clearly is the EU’s idea, describing the disclosure requirements 
as part of a broader agenda.196 
Inhabitants of the planets Hart and Kelsen may still stress that legally, the 
fiduciary duties in a technical sense have not changed at all. But this argument does 
not prove much in the context of transnational law (and thus transnational fiduciary 
law) which conceives “norm” in a broader sense.197 What is relevant here is that the 
EU legislator clearly acts based on an understanding of the UN Guiding Principles 
and other international ESG standards as “authoritative” and “internationally 
 
189.   Directive 2014/95/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 
2014 amending Directive 2013/34 as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by 
certain large undertakings and groups, 2014 O.J. (L 330) 1. 
190.   Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A renewed EU strategy 
2011-14 for Corporate Social Responsibility, COM (2011) 681 final (Nov. 25, 2011) [hereinafter 
Communication from the Commission]. Recital (2) of the Directive 2014/95/EU (supra note 189) 
explicitly refers to this document. 
191.   Id. at 6. 
192.   Directive 2014/95/EU, supra note 189, at 6–8. 
193.   Communication from the Commission: Guidelines on non-financial reporting 
(methodology for reporting non-financial information), C/2017/4234, 2017 O.J. (C 215) 1. 
194.   See Conac, supra note 183; Geburtstag, supra note 5, at 229, 230. 
195.   E.g., Holger Fleischer, Vermessung eines Forschungsfeldes aus rechtlicher Sicht, in CORPORATE 
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 1, 31 (Holger Fleischer, Susanne Kalss & Hans-Ueli Vogt eds., 2018). Some 
German scholars have argued to the contrary, i.e., that the reporting standards indirectly alter the board 
members’ fiduciary duties under German law, e.g. Peter Hommelhoff, Nichtfinanzielle Ziele in Unternehmen 
von öffentlichem Interesse – Die Revolution übers Bilanzrecht, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR BRUNO KÜBLER 291 
(Reinhard Bork, Godehard Kayser & Frank Kebekus eds., 2015). 
196.   See Communication from the Commission, supra note 190, at 7. 
197.   Halliday & Shaffer, supra note 30, at 11. 
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recognised[sic] principles” for CSR and CSR-related duties in general.198 Disclosure 
rules concerning non-financial information are just one element of a broader 
strategy to push “enterprises [to adopt] a process to integrate social, environmental, 
ethical, human rights and consumer concerns into their business operations and 
core strategy in close collaboration with their stakeholders . . .”199 They represent 
an expression of this broader conception rather than being an exception to the rule. 
From a policy point of view, these guidelines and principles unfold normative 
thrust, especially in countries with already more stakeholder-oriented approaches in 
corporate law. 
c. Acknowledgment Through the Enforcement of Rights, Remedies and Exercise of Power 
Even in nation states without comprehensive ESG legislation such as the 
United States, ESG standards start becoming influential in shaping fiduciary law, at 
least from a socio-legal perspective. Institutional investors increasingly put ESG on 
the corporate policy agenda, calling for boards to disclose and act according to 
established international frameworks such as the UN Guiding Principles. 
BlackRock, one of the world’s largest investment firms, professes to monitor and 
engage “with companies to encourage them to adopt business practices consistent 
with sustainable long-term value creation,”  citing ESG as a prime example.200 
BlackRock has been a signatory to the United Nations-backed Principles for 
Responsible Investment (PRI) since 2008.201 Given this changing environment, 
corporate boards not dealing with ESG matters will more likely slide between a rock 
and a hard place, with non-governmental organizations such as OxFam as additional 
watchers on the wall.202 
Institutional investors like BlackRock and other groups hold a rich set of cards 
in their hands. They can submit shareholder proposals, initiate campaigns against 
incumbent directors at annual meetings or divest of their holdings in a corporation, 
to name but a few examples. Imagine Carl Icahn “tweeting” not that he had a 
“cordial dinner with Tim” (Cook),203 but his dissatisfaction with management’s 
approach to environmental issues–”will divest US$ 1 bill. in shares tomorrow.” 
Publicly asking management to explain why poultry workers–not in Bangladesh, but 
 
198.   See Communication from the Commission, supra note 190. 
199.   Id. at 6–7. 
200.   See BlackRock Investment Stewardship: Protecting our clients’ assets for the long-term, BLACKROCK 
1, 4, https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/blk-profile-of-blackrock-
investment-stewa rdship-team-work.pdf (last accessed Oct. 15, 2019). 
201.   Id. at 19. 
202.   See, e.g., Chloe Christman, PepsiCo is moving from policy to practice, OXFAM: THE POLITICS OF 
POVERTY (Feb. 6, 2018), https://politicsofpoverty.oxfamamerica.org/2018/02/pepsico-from-policy-
to-practice/ (last accessed Oct. 15, 2019). 
203.   Carl Icahn (@Carl_C_Icahn), TWITTER (Oct. 1, 2013, 7:23 AM), 
https://twitter.com/carl_c icahn/status /385047418284158976 (last visited Oct. 15, 2019). On the 
market reaction, see, for example, Steven Russolillo, Carl Icahn Tweets About ‘Cordial Dinner’ With Tim 
Cook, WALL ST. J.: MONEYBEAT (Oct. 1, 2013), https://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/10/01/carl-
icahn-tweets-about-cordial-dinner-with-tim-cook/ (last accessed Oct. 15, 2019). 
76 UCI JRNL. OF INT’L, TRANSNATIONAL, & COMP. L. [Vol.  5:47 
in the United States–have to wear diapers at work204 will not slip away unattended 
on a corporate board agenda’s backside. In these and other circumstances, reality in 
the boardroom will prevail over the courtroom, even in Delaware. Notwithstanding 
the Delaware creed of shareholder primacy and shareholder value only,205 measures 
like those mentioned before have to be addressed by corporate directors. Not doing 
so creates more bad publicity and, at least in many cases, causes stock prices to take 
a dive. Recent surveys suggest that the majority of corporate boards engage seriously 
and regularly with ESG-issues.206 One hundred eighty-one CEOs signed the 2019 
statement of the “Business Roundtable” in the United States, proclaiming publicly 
a commitment to all stakeholders.207 There is good cause to question the motives 
behind corporate ESG-commitment.208 But there is also no denying the fact that 
companies are implementing and debating ESG-policies following the standards 
and principles outlined above. 
Moreover, most pundits agree that shareholder primacy statutes such as the 
Delaware General Corporation Law leave room for paying attention to stakeholder 
interests in the course of ordinary business decisions.209 Whereas the norms in their 
purest form–”shareholders only” versus mandatory inclusion of stakeholders–grind 
against each other, the business judgment rule typically works as the sheet anchor, 
“though [management] may have to be just a bit careful about what they say.”210 
Change of control and corporate takeovers are the scenarios in which Delaware 
courts require boards to act single-mindedly in the interests of shareholders.211 They 
do not happen on a daily basis. 
 
204.   See U.S. poultry workers wear diapers on job over lack of bathroom breaks, THE GUARDIAN, (May 
12, 2016, last modified Jul 14, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/may/12/poultry-
workers-wear-diapers-work-bathroom-breaks (last visited Oct. 15, 2019). 
205.   See McDonnell, supra note 175, at 8, 18, for a recent overview. 
206.   See, e.g., Pearl Meyer Quick Poll: Environmental and Social Governance (ESG) and its Potential Link 
to Incentives, PEARL MEYER, (March 2017), https://www.pearlmeyer.com/knowledge-share/research-
report/ pearl-meyer-quick-poll-environmental-and-social-governance-esg-and-its-potential-link-to 
incentives (last visited Oct. 15, 2019). 
207.   Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy 
That Serves All Americans,’ Business Roundtable: Corporate Governance (Aug. 19, 2019), 
https://www.busin essroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-a-corporation-to 
pro mote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans (last accessed Oct. 15, 2019). 
208.   Early stakeholder-friendly statutes in the U.S. just mirrored anti-takeover provisions in the 
articles of association, thereby giving cause to believe that the motive was protecting incumbent 
management, not protecting workers or the environment. See Jonathan D. Springer, Corporate Constituency 
Statutes: Hollow Hopes and False Fears, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85, 94 (1999); with respect to Minnesota, 
see McDonnell, supra note 175, at 18. 
209.   See McDonnell, supra note 175, at 20, 28. 
210.   Id. at 20. 
211.   See the crisp analysis by McDonnell, supra note 175, at 18–22. 
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C. Transnational, Not Global Fiduciary Law 
Not a few authors mining the veins of transnational legal theory posit the 
emergence of “world law”212 or “global law.”213 Tamar Frankel, arguably the mother 
of the field of fiduciary law in the common law world, sees universal fiduciary 
principles at work and argues for the adoption of a hybrid system of fiduciary law.214 
Whereas the functional approach builds a bridge over the troubled waters separating 
common law and civil law, unifying the two worlds with respect to fiduciary law 
may appeal to many as a matter of legal politics, but is likely to run into serious 
trouble in practice. In light of the remaining differences between civil law and 
common law systems (and the considerable differences between legal systems 
within the respective families), a more cautious approach allowing for the 
emergence of several transnational legal orders215 seems the more promising road 
to travel. 
This is corroborated by the fact that, as Clifford Geertz famously put it, law is 
local knowledge.216 Searching for and then comparing abstract legal principles 
therefore does not amount to much,217 especially in transnational law or so-called 
“global” law. “[G]lobal doctrine becomes clothed in local knowledge.”218 It is 
enmeshed in prior customs and legal traditions. Different legal systems may co-exist 
side by side or tie the knot, leading to a hybrid, neither common law nor civil law, 
built on layers upon layers of regime changes and shifting political environments.219 
There is no peeling off the eggshells of common law or civil law and out comes the 
global fiduciary law chick. Acknowledging and accepting principles of fiduciary duty 
or, more generally, fiduciary law in any given system, no matter whether bred within 
it or transplanted from the outside, will work only if the relevant rules and principles 
latch on to what is there already. Transnational legal orders most likely arise based 
on pre-existing bonds and shared traditions. 
 
212.   Harold J. Berman, World Law, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1617, 1619 (1995) (“[T]he word 
‘transnational’ refers back to the era of sovereign national states and indicates that it is to be 
transcended. It does not, however, give a new name to the new era that all humanity has entered. The 
right name for the new era, I submit, is ‘emerging world society,’ and the right name for the law by 
which it is governed is ‘world law.’”). 
213.   Teubner, supra note 34, at 4 (“Thus we see a number of inchoate forms of global law, 
none of which are the creations of states.”). 
214.   Frankel, supra note 14, at 432–34. 
215.   See, e.g., Halliday & Shaffer, supra note 30, at 18–21. 
216.   CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE 167 (1993) (“[L]aw and ethnography are crafts 
of place: they work by the light of local knowledge.”). 
217.   See id. at 218; see also Andrew Harding, Global Doctrine and Local Knowledge: Law in South East 
Asia, 51 INT’L. & COMP. L. Q. 35 (2002). 
218.   Harding, supra note 217, at 45. 
219.   This has been demonstrated for South East Asia. See, e.g., Harding, supra note 217; Carol 
G.S. Tan, Law and Legal Systems in South East Asia: Three Paths to a Viewpoint, in TRADING 
ARRANGEMENTS IN THE PACIFIC RIM – ASEAN AND APEC, Commentaries, 1 (Paul J. Davidson ed., 
1998). 
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IV. ELEMENTS OF TRANSNATIONAL FIDUCIARY LAW 
As already stated in the introduction, transnational legal orders unfold in terms 
of geographic and legal scope.220 Until now, this Article has dealt with the 
geographic scope as the first prong of transnational legal ordering. The following 
section takes up the second prong, i.e. the elements of transnational legal orders. 
Employing a transnational perspective not only ushers in delineating multiple 
spaces of transnational legal ordering of fiduciary law. It also reveals how fiduciary 
law on the transnational plane develops elements different from national legal 
orders, either as variations on common themes such as the duty of loyalty or because 
the content of fiduciary obligations diverges from national law. First of all, as Sub-
section 1. will show, the distinctiveness of the duty of loyalty, an issue of the highest 
importance in national common law legal orders, may play out differently, 
depending on the scope of contract. Secondly, Sub-section 2. demonstrates that 
even within the common law, court communication between individual nation 
states may engender several fiduciary legal orders. Thirdly, Sub-section 3. argues 
that the duty of loyalty does not necessarily become manifest in a single norm which, 
when applied to a fact-pattern, unfolds in more fine-grained specific rules, but may 
also be the result of bundling together a number of particular rules. In other words, 
different legal orders may construct the duty of loyalty differently. Again, East Asia 
provides an example at hand. 
A. The Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty and the Scope of Contract in Common Law and Civil Law 
Given the peculiarities of fiduciary obligations compared to contract law in 
the common law world, the outcome of a case hinges on which drawer a judge pulls 
open. It is most importantly the duty of loyalty where fiduciary law and contract law 
part ways. Loyalty “is one of the most prominent features of fiduciary law[,] . . . 
often considered essential to fiduciary relationships . . .”221 It “is a part of what gives 
the field its distinctive qualities.”222 Millet J, in the seminal decision Bristol & West 
Building Society v Mothew, held it to be the “distinguishing obligation of a fiduciary . . 
.”223 
Embracing a particular obligation as part of the duty of loyalty224 is of double 
import in the common law. At least historically, it helps to overcome several 
shortcomings of contract law. Fiduciary duties arise without having to follow a 
certain set of rules governing formalities of forming an enforceable agreement.225 
 
220.   See Halliday & Shaffer, supra note 30. 
221.   Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller, Introduction to THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
FIDUCIARY LAW 5 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014). 
222.   Gold, supra note 75, at 386. 
223.   Millet J, Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew [1996] EWCA (Civ) 33, [1996] 4 All 
ER 698 [711]–[712] (Eng.). 
224.   On the varying accounts of the duty of loyalty’s contents see Gold, supra note 75, at 387–
89. 
225.   See Sarah Worthington, The Commercial Utility of the Trust Vehicle, in EXTENDING THE 
BOUNDARIES OF TRUST AND SIMILAR RING-FENCED FUNDS 135, 147, 150 (David Hayton ed., 2002). 
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Other than a party to a contract, the beneficiary of a fiduciary obligation may compel 
the fiduciary to specific performance and not only claim damages.226 Beneficiaries 
have rights against the fiduciary, whereas (English) contract law did protect only the 
parties of the contract.227 
When contract law provides for specific performance, does not require 
consideration, and knows third-party beneficiaries, as is the case in civil law 
jurisdictions, the coordinates change. To a certain extent, speaking of a duty of 
loyalty and fiduciary obligation(s) loses its significance. Sorting a breach into the 
register of “contract” instead of “loyalty” then does not make much of a difference, 
as long as the judge qualifies the fiduciary’s behavior as a breach of their obligations. 
What makes this interesting from the perspective of transnational legal theory 
is not the comparative insight. Rather, it is important as a potentially constitutive 
feature of a transnational legal order. In the end, loyalty keeps pride of place as the 
distinctive feature of fiduciary law in its transnational version. But it is distinctive 
first and foremost viewed from an overarching functional perspective–wherever the 
law specifically requires a person enjoying discretionary other-regarding powers to 
act loyally towards a beneficiary, transnational fiduciary law emerges. Consequently, 
transnational fiduciary law knows different shades of loyalty and therefore offers 
room for different transnational fiduciary legal orders. 
B. Contents of Fiduciary Obligations 
Speaking of transnational fiduciary law in the common law world can mean 
two different things. First, all jurisdictions hold the duty of loyalty near and dear to 
the heart of the fiduciary relationship.228 Commonwealth courts frequently cite and 
discuss decisions of courts in other nation states belonging to the same legal family. 
Sharing the common law background, traditions and history of the British colonial 
empire, there is a strong degree of connected history and entanglement.229 Perhaps 
somewhat counter intuitively, especially for the civil lawyer dabbling in matters of 
equity law, it is not only English law and English courts influencing courts in the 
former dominion. Starting with an Australian case, court communication between 
Australian and English courts across national borders has led to at least two 
transnational legal orders in fiduciary law, one including the United States of 
America, the other excluding it. They overlap insofar the duty of loyalty is 
concerned. But as far as the duty of care is at issue, there are different transnational 
legal spaces of fiduciary law. 
Second, in the seminal case Permanent Building Society (in liq) v Wheeler, the 
Australian Supreme Court, led by Ipp J, denied the duty of care having a fiduciary 
 
226.   Id. at 150. 
227.   Id. at 150. In the United States, the situation is different. See Langbein, supra note 45, at 
653. 
228.   See supra II.3. 
229.   See supra III.1.b.ii, for theoretical background on connected history and entanglement. 
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character, qualifying only the duty of loyalty as truly fiduciary in nature.230 That was 
taken up by the English High Court and Millet J in the also seminal decision Bristol 
& West Building Society v Mothew.231 Just like the example of trust legislation in East 
Asia, courts in the United Kingdom and Australia watch each other and, sometimes, 
communicate in their reasoning. This establishes another example of connected 
histories as the development of the law–fiduciary law in this case–is the product of 
shared experiences and legal reasoning across national borders. 
A skeptic might argue that even those who think of the duty of care as a 
fiduciary obligation doubt its quality as a distinctive feature of fiduciary 
relationships232 or even deny it.233 Starting with this critical view as a premise, one 
might deny the existence of two transnational orders of fiduciary law in the common 
law world. Nevertheless, the question remains relevant. Where the duty of care kept 
its place under the fiduciary roof, it interacts with the duty of loyalty.234 Put 
differently, courts seem to construe the demands of loyalty in light of how the duty 
of care works, inside or outside the fiduciary relationship–defined narrowly. Vice 
versa, as the Japanese example shows,235 duties of care can gobble up parts of what 
in Australia is defined in terms of loyalty. 
It is open to further research to assess court practice and see to what extent 
judges following the Australian and English approach allocate issues to the duty of 
loyalty their US counterparts would solve referring to the duty of care. 
C. Constructing the Duty of Loyalty 
Anyone looking for a duty of loyalty as the distinctive feature of transnational 
law has to consider that not all jurisdictions construct this duty comparable to the 
common law approach, i.e. as a single rule which then is divided into several sub-
norms depending on the fact pattern in case. Alternatively or in addition, the duty 
 
230.   Ipp J, Permanent Building Society (in liq) v Wheeler (1994) 11 WAR 187, 239 (Austl.); see 
also Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71 (Austl.). 
231.   Millet J, Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew [1996] EWCA (Civ) 33, [1996] 4 All 
ER 698 [711]–[712] (Eng.). This is not to say that the issue has been definitely settled either in the 
United Kingdom or in Australia. The line of cases mentioned above is subject to severe criticism. See, 
e.g., Dyson Heydon QC, Modern Fiduciary Liability: The Sick Man of Equity?, 20 TRUST & TRUSTEES 1006 
(2014). In recent years, several court decisions may well be interpreted as scaling back on the issue and 
at least propagating a more nuanced view. The courts are carefully citing cases of the pre-1994 era. See, 
e.g., Pitt v Holt [2011] EWCA (Civ) 197 and [2013] UKSC 26 (Eng.); Ancient Order of Foresters in Victoria 
Friendly Society Limited v Lifeplan Australia Friendly Society Limited [2018] HCA 43 (Austl.). For the purposes 
of this Article, however, these criticisms and newer developments in the case law do not change the 
fact that—at least for more than a decade—English and Australian courts developed a distinct concept 
of fiduciary law by communicating across borders. 
232.   On the fiduciary duty of care and its precarious status in the United States, see John C.P. 
Goldberg, The Fiduciary Duty of Care, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 405 (Evan J. 
Criddle et al. eds., 2019). 
233.   Peter Birks, The Content of Fiduciary Obligation, 34 ISRAEL L. REV. 3, 35 (2000) (The duty of 
care “is a fiduciary obligation, but is not, as such, distinguishable from any contractual or non-
contractual duty of care.”). 
234.   Goldberg, supra note 232, at 407. 
235.   See infra 3. 
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of care bears the potential of solving loyalty-related issues. Again, the functional 
perspective governs the analysis of fiduciary law on the transnational level.236 Once 
more, the “East Asian Four” provide an example at hand.237 
Until recently, China, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea did not have an open-
ended standard establishing a fiduciary duty of loyalty in trust law. They have 
implemented a more diverse set of rules, each addressing a more specific aspect of 
the trustee’s obligation.238 Combined in a bundle, however, they yield the idea of 
loyalty.239 Moreover, they “impose the core trust obligations on a trustee.” 240 This 
turns the common law doctrine on its head; instead of loyalty as a ground rule from 
which courts extract more specific duties,241 they generate a general rule by 
induction. As in Germany and other civil law jurisdictions, these duties add to the 
regular set of contractual obligations without having fundamentally different 
remedies. 
One should hasten to add that, in 2006 and 2011 respectively, Japan and South 
Korea introduced generic duties of loyalty.242 What remains to be seen, however, is 
the extent to which these duties will be able to lead a life on their own. Taking into 
account the other and more specific rules on a trustee’s obligations, it is likely that 
courts will construe a much narrower scope of application and judge cases referring 
to the more specific duties and other sets or rules. 
Experiences with Japanese corporate law corroborate this assumption. Under 
US military rule, Japan introduced a duty of loyalty in its corporate law in 1950, in 
addition to an older provision on agency law, also applicable on corporate directors, 
which imposes a duty of care.243 Nevertheless, the Japanese Supreme Court held the 
general agency provision to comprise a duty of loyalty, rendering the later corporate 
law provision superfluous.244 It was only later, in 1989, that the Supreme Court 
switched gears in corporate law and now solves at least some loyalty issues by relying 
on the specific corporate law provision.245 Nevertheless, Japanese courts do not use 
this provision extensively246 and still seem to cling to the old Supreme Court 
decision.247 Corporate and comparative law scholars weigh different reasons for this 
reluctancy.248 One of these reasons, however, unsurprisingly seems to be the legal 
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environment the duty of loyalty was transplanted into.249 The idea was already 
there250 and found its way into court practice by other normative means. Outside 
the corporate law arena, Japanese judges solve loyalty issues based on the general 
agency provision until this day.251 
V.  SUMMARY 
Viewing fiduciary law from the perspective of transnational legal theory 
provides important insights into the emergence of legal orders and processes of 
legal ordering transcending the boundaries of nation states. All legal systems have 
to deal with problems arising out of relationships in which one person enjoys 
discretionary powers over the interests of another. Interestingly, but perhaps not 
surprisingly, both common law and civil law jurisdictions have developed a set of 
tools subjecting the person having powers under loyalty constraints in various ways. 
Regardless of their differences in traditions and technical approaches, from a 
functional perspective the divide between common law and civil law may be 
crossed. 
On the one hand, this perspective makes it possible to paint a picture of 
fiduciary law outside the common law. It helps to understand how norms and 
institutions taken from the common law (such as the trust) may survive and 
profligate in civil law systems, which lack an equity tradition. On the other hand, 
using the example of trust law as an instance of fiduciary law shows that 
conventional transnational legal theory leaves a blind spot, because it concentrates 
too much on norms “beyond” the nation state being incorporated or acknowledged 
in national legal institutions. 
Transnational fiduciary law develops in different spaces and may develop in 
horizontal and vertical dimensions. Horizontal transnational ordering concerns the 
flow of norms between nation states. The example of the trust in four East Asian 
countries, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and China, demonstrates that legal orders 
may evolve in reaction to each other, using and implementing norms created in 
other nation states. This recursive process is not captured by traditional accounts of 
comparative law. Transnational legal theory offers a methodological toolbox which 
allows one to better focus on the process of norm creation beyond nation states. 
The case study of so-called “soft law” on ESG is an example of vertical 
transnational ordering of fiduciary law. Exploring fiduciary law from a transnational 
angle and its socio-legal point of view adds value, because it lays bare several ways 
in which non-binding norms created by international organizations like the UN or 
the OECD unfold normative thrust, even in legal systems resting on legal concepts 
like shareholder value. 
Last, but not least, employing a transnational perspective provides insights into 
how the contents of fiduciary obligations may be conceptualized differently in 
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different (transnational) legal orders. Even though the duty of loyalty remains 
distinct, its import may differ from order to order. Moreover, the contents of 
fiduciary obligations may vary. Communication between courts in Australia and 
England led to a transnational fiduciary legal order where the duty of care is no 
longer considered having the quality of a fiduciary obligation. 
 
